Remoaners use ridicule to try to reach the ‘yoof’ vote.

 

 

It is interesting that most of the marchers on 23 June seemed to be of the older generation! Open Britain claimed 170,000 supporters for their People’s Vote petition – 1% of the actual Leave vote. It wasn’t on the government website with independent verification, and the petition webpage seemed to show multiple signatures and a lot of foreign names.

To overturn the referendum result, crank Remoaners howl “Let the people have their say”. Hypocritically when Leave media reps are interviewed on College Green, cranks try to disrupt the show for viewers and effectively stop people having their say.

Unable to accept democracy, a Remoaner tactic is to try to link Brexit with the negative – “hate crime”, “no NHS”, Trump, (uncheckable) long term forecasts of doom and gloom.

When we got comments putting the record straight over job fears on a key local paper website, soundbite addict Remoaners were reduced to retorting “You’re a Putin bot”.

Article produced by Brian Mooney of Resistance

White Paper Whitewash

Dramatic events after the Chequers cabinet meeting. A government in chaos with 8 months before Brexit. What is going on?

The White Paper on the future UK-EU relationship has united Remainers and Leavers against it. There’s no point reviewing a work that’s already scrap.

However Britain and the EU only need to agree a non-binding declaration on this. The real battle is over the 80% ready Withdrawal Agreement (WA).

The BBC’s new Europe Editor, Katya Adler, has proved to be objective, fair and switched on over some key issues.

Adler predicts that much negotiation work will be needed after Brexit! We cannot agree a new free trade deal until we’ve left and become “a third country” (e.g.). The Lisbon Treaty has produced an uneven playing field that means that the trading relationship will have to be a continuation of the EEA Agreement (“Single Market”) or falling back onto WTO-only rules.

A trade minister confirmed intentions to stay in the EEA until 2021. However the EU (Withdrawal) Act (EUWA) will repeal the legislation for this on 29 Mar unless Brexit is stopped or a new EU Withdrawal and Implementation Act (EUWAIA) is agreed.in Parliament, reflecting whatever WA deal is made.

If Britain and the EU cannot both ratify a deal, the only alternative to WTO-rules only is for both sides to request a dispensation (WTO Waiver) to allow current trading terms to continue.

This would help keep trade flowing on Single Market lines, but require Britain and the EU then having a working agreement, including a clear plan for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

Monmouth MP David TC Davies rues that there seems no Parliamentary majority for any one kind of Brexit.

Labour’s “Six Tests” would mean opposing any deal that wasn’t a close match to EU membership. Jeremy Corbyn seeks to exploit any defeat on the government to bring about a General Election. Deputy leader Tom Watson won’t rule out a second referendum. The New Statesman adds that a petition needed only 1400 more names for Labour to debate making this party policy!

At the same time we must ask if a Withdrawal Agreement  deal was agreed to the EU’s liking, would pro-EU Labour really scupper it? With UKIP reviving, would Labour seek to fight an election as the party that ignored many of its voters and stopped Brexit (even temporarily)?

European leaders are having jitters. Austria’s Sebastian Kurz, leading the EU until December, is hot on avoiding hard Brexit. Adler notes that many in the EU don’t want Brexit. (This could in theory lead to delaying Brexit for continuing negotiations, which, if repeated indefinitely, would block it.)

However Adler senses an EU feeling “Brexit must be done in time”, but with a perception that our government tends to make a fuss then just cave in. EU negotiator Michel Barnier has been pushing Britain to remain in the Single Market and Customs Union.

Whereas Barnier’s assistant Stefaan de Rynck hinted that Britain would duly get a FTA, Berlin Foreign Policy journalist Dave Keating warned that “Transition is likely to be permanent”.

Even if a British government preferred to end “vassal status” in 2021, a FTA could take a good 5 or 6 years to agree, according to former WTO head Pascal Lamy. (This could be reduced if parts of the existing EEA Agreement were carried forward.)

The EU would also have to be willing to offer us a more flexible trading deal and could simply say “Take it or leave it – and lose trading rights”.

However, time can be a healer, and with the ghosts of Brexit exorcised, the EU might realise there’s an opportunity to deepen trade with its largest trading partner? The EU is supposed to back a WTO holy grail of multi-lateral free trade – a single global FTA covering substantially all goods and services. It won’t happen overnight, but a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Britain would provide a ready model towards freeing up trade for other partners?

Another option is an Association Agreement (AA). Guy Verhofstadt, a Belgian liberal MEP, has proposed one for Britain. The Lisbon Treaty already provides for an AA for countries with a “special relationship, with “the same treatment” (i.e. privileges) on trade? However, there is more flexibility – a proposed new AA for Chile wouldn’t involve payments to the EU, free movement or being under the ECJ, yet could cover most goods and services.

This article first appeared in Brian Mooney’s Resistance newsletter and is reproduced with permission

Brexit White Paper July 2018 fails to deliver frictionless trade

Unworkable, risky wishful thinking on frictionless Single Market trade

The Government’s recent White Paper entitled The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is unworkable, risky wishful thinking as far as frictionless trade with the Single Market (and wider European Economic Area, EEA) is concerned. The White Paper also fails to take cognisance of how the European Union (EU) and Single Market functions, and its direction of travel, which makes it unlikely that the EU can accept it. If the EU did accept these insubstantial, ‘cherry picking’ proposals, businesses and regulatory authorities, etc. would struggle to make them work.

This short examination does not consider Facilitated Customs Arrangements etc. It is difficult to work out exactly what is being proposed and how it will operate. However, it appears to be unproven and to increase the complexity and costs of importing and exporting goods and services.

Vague unreality without any practical solutions

A major shortcoming of the White Paper is the lack of detail.  It is unclear what the various terms used and their proposals actually mean in practice, what they cover and what they omit. There is also no recognition of any problems or limiting issues that need to be addressed, and no consideration of timescales or resources needed to turn the theory into reality.  Important terms not explained include: goods, services, Common Rulebook, Free Trade Area for goods, approvals and authorisations, ‘sit alongside’, ‘open and fair’ and ‘participation in EU agencies’.  These are critical to understanding and avoiding impracticalities, ambiguities, arguments (with the EU) and confusion.

Whilst goods and services are to be treated differently, there is no analysis about how they can be separated, which could often be very impractical.  The only example of a product, vaguely and briefly considered, is mutual recognition of type approval of motor vehicles, which is itself unlikely to be acceptable to the EU.

The EU’s legal basis for Frictionless Trade in Goods is ignored

The White Paper’s aspiration is for frictionless access for goods – a free trade area part in and part outside the Single Market. There would then be one set of approvals and authorisations for goods to be sold in both markets (UK and Single Market). How this will work is unclear given that EU Directives (the EU Acquis) relating to the Single Market governs how it functions.

The EU’s direction of travel (for the Single Market), is towards harmonised standards, regulations, and enforcement or surveillance through a top-down centralised legalistic and bureaucratic framework. This gives the European Commission and agencies ultimate control inside the Single Market.  This is the basis for frictionless trade. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) incorporates relevant EU Directives into their own body of EFTA/EEA law in order for them to participate in the wider EEA.

Generally there are no deviations from the EU Directives except those permitted within the existing legal regulatory framework.  Any change must be incorporated into EU law first.  Countries outside the Single Market (and wider EEA) are ‘third’ countries effectively outside EU control or surveillance necessitating appropriate measures regarding imports.  The White Paper effectively ignores this and assumes the EU will agree to the changes and the UK exceptionalism being proposed.

The EU’s Directives for Products are ignored

The White Paper does not mention any actual EU/EEA legislation and how it will be affected, nor does it discuss practicalities. There is also no acknowledgement of the EU’s position on trade in goods with ‘third’ countries.  The EU’s legally mandated arrangements to control diseases and parasites etc. in imported livestock, products, plants, packaging etc. from ‘third’ countries are largely glossed over.

Note:    EU’s approach (to products) is outlined in principle in COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Enhancing the Implementation of the New Approach Directives , in more detail in the EU’s Guide to the implementation of directives based on the New Approach and the Global Approach and encapsulated in EU law in REGULATION (EC) No 765/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93. The EU has also recently spelt out its position, which is consistent with their New and Global Approach Directives, in Notice to stakeholders withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of industrial products.   The adverse effect of Mrs May’s Brexit on a frequently essential part of this product jigsaw (the work of Notified Bodies for mandatory conformity assessment of products) is explained here.

According to EU law, products of animal origin (meat and meat products) imported into the EU must be inspected (sanitary checks) at Border Inspection Posts (BIPs). For products of plant origin (for plants and plant-derived foods) phytosanitary checks are required at Community Entry Points (CEPs, Designated Points of Entry, DPE).

The White Paper adds a new level of complexity to the Single Market and EEA

The White Paper’s advocacy of regulatory alignment and mutual recognition adds further complexity.  It would inevitably require considerable amendment to existing EU Directives covering a wide range of products and associated production, regulatory and conformity assessment and market surveillance. This is far from straightforward or quick given that requirements are effectively intertwined; change one here and there can be a knock-on effect elsewhere. Then there is the creation of new precedents that produce anomalies elsewhere and situations that can be exploited by others to gain an unfair or unreasonable advantage.

Also, more errors and anomalies are likely to occur when time is short to develop revised legislation, standards, conformity assessments, accreditations and market surveillance processes etc. Obviously it is far from certain that the EU will agree to this in any instances.  If it did, this would impose new uncertainties and risks where before matters were fairly settled and predictable.

No Go Chaos for Nobos and their Conformity Assessments of Products

Notified Bodies need accreditation for carrying out mandatory independent conformity assessment on a wide range of products to be placed on the market in the EEA. They need separate accreditation (Designated Body, Debo) when carrying out assessments relating to national specific or special cases covered by EU/EEA legislation.  The White Paper proposes a Common Rulebook (harmonisation with EU rules) applying to goods to be exported to the Single Market but not to services.  Clearly the work of Nobos and Debos are services falling outside any compliance with the EU Rulebook whatever that vague term is supposed to mean in this context; for example, EU Directives with or with European specifications, mandatory conformity assessment, market surveillance etc.

Under the White Paper’s proposals, a new product could be assessed by a Debo and then exported to the EEA where the Debo’s accreditation and product conformity assessment is currently not recognised. Obtaining this recognition raises a host of practical problems, such as who gives the Debo accreditation, how is the Debo assessed, who keeps the register of accredited Debos and test houses, and what should the Debo now include in its product conformity assessment and certification?  Where an existing product undergoes a material change requiring further or updated assessment, more difficulties will inevitably result in determining whether this is Debo or Nobo work or a combination and who does what.  This complexity and vagueness needs to be resolved or a wide range of UK goods would become non-compliant and could not be exported to the EEA.

The Practical Alternative

Mrs May’s Government is proposing an unworkable Brexit in name only. However, instead it could have opted for a workable real Brexit by remaining temporarily in the Single Market (or wider European Economic Area, EEA) under much more favourable and flexible conditions by re-joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). (Further information see The EFTA/EEA Solution to the Current Brexit Impasse, Brexit Reset, Eureferendum.com, various posts on Campaign for an Independent Britain and affiliates )

The Devil is in the Missing Detail

So far there is little indication that the UK’s negotiators actually understand much, if anything, about the minutiae of the EU Directives and how the EU/EEA functions.  Even if the EU agreed to this White Paper (and this is a very  big ‘If’), the resulting outcome is most likely to be more, largely avoidable confusion all round carrying on for years among customers, suppliers, regulators, conformity assessors (e.g. Notified Bodies) and organisations involved in market surveillance.  The frequent questions would be “Where do we find the requirements?”, “Must we comply with this requirement?”, “What does this requirement actually mean?”, and “How much is this going to cost us?”

In short, the whole document is seriously deficient and likely to be rejected by the EU.

Small teacup, big storm?

The agreement hammered out at Chequers last Friday went down like a lead balloon among Tory Brexit supporters. Here is the text of the final statement.  Martin Howe QC, from Lawyers for Britain, produced a briefing which expressed grave concern that it would leave us tied in perpetuity to EU law and forced to accept binding rulings by the European Court of Justice.

The EU laws in question were those relating to goods, their composition, their packaging, how they are tested, etc etc, in order to enable goods to cross the UK/EU border without controls. This does, of course, raise the question as to how aware critics like Mr Howe actually are that many rules governing standards within the Single Market are not actually set by Brussels. The EU merely acts as a conduit for laws originating with global standards bodies to which we would have to be subject regardless of the Brexit model adopted.

Note the word “goods” rather than “trade”. Mrs May’s proposals would have seen the UK essentially remain in the single market for goods but not for services.  This was never going to wash with the EU. as some commentators were warning within hours of the statement being released.

Its pie-in-the-sky nature did not stop a deluge of negative comment. A majority of Conservative Party members regarded it as a bad deal, so said Paul Goodman after conducting a snap poll for Conservative Home.  More ominously, a poll commissioned by Change Britain suggested that a deal along the lines of that proposed by Mrs May would cost the Tories a lot of votes. For example, 32% of voters would be less likely to vote Conservative if the Government agreed a deal which results in UK laws being subject to rulings by EU courts and More than a quarter would be less likely to support the Conservative Party if a deal meant that the EU retained some or substantial control of the UK’s ability to negotiate our own free trade agreements.

Still, if the EU’s spokesmen had acted quickly to reject the deal out of hand, it would have been a storm in a teacup for the Tories, which would have blown over. Simon Coveney, the Irish Republic’s Foreign Minister, said that Michel Barnier would find it “difficult ” to accept the  proposals. It is now quite probable that he won’t have to do so as a crisis has erupted at the very heart of Mrs May’s government. On Sunday night, David Davis resigned. Effectively sidelined by Olly Robbins for many months, the most surprising aspect of Mr Davis’ announcement is that it has taken so long in coming. With him went his deputy Steve Baker. Mrs May reacted speedily and appointed Dominic Raab, a prominent Brexit supporter, to replace Mr Davis. However, within hours of Mr Davis going, Boris Johnson resigned as Foreign Secretary.

This means that a small teacup is producing what could turn out to be a considerable storm. Mrs May is due to meet her backbenchers later this evening and especially given her decision to brief Labour and Lib Dem MPs on her Brexit proposals, the mood is likely to be sombre if not angry.

One Labour source said of this meeting, “It’s an opportunity to tell the PM’s chief of staff why the Government has got it so wrong.”  With that, we would agree.  Almost every government publication on the subject of Brexit is, at best muddled.  The fisheries white paper also appeared last week – its publication somewhat overshadowed by the dramatic events following the Chequers meeting.  We will provide some further comment oin this later this week, but suffice it to say it seems very optimistic, ignoring the determination of the EU to preserve its access to our waters and to control the allocation of quota if it gets half a chance.

With events happening so quickly, it is impossible to predict whether Mrs May will face a leadership challenge or indeed whether the Brexit talks will break down. However, we have been saying for some time that a crisis is essential if the disastrous Brexit plans hatched by Mrs May, including the fatally flawed transitional arrangements, are to be jettisoned. At long last, it looks like the crisis has arrived.

 

What is the truth of freedom of movement?

Whilst it is often stated that Freedom of Movement is a non-negotiable and a fundamental indivisible principle of the Single Market, the truth is actually far more complex.  The ‘four freedoms’ are not indivisible for countries outside the EU, such as those who are members of the European Economic Area, (EEA).

Furthermore, the EU has made provision in legally binding and proposed agreements unilaterally to control freedom of movement along with the other freedoms of the Single Market.  The UK could do the same if it remained a member of the Single Market (and wider European Economic Area, EEA) by re-joining The European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  The same actually applies to the EU’s proposed draft text to the Withdrawal Agreement.  Thus Mrs May and her government are, at least in this regard, determined to pursue a Brexit strategy (Brexit in name only) which is far worse than what is actually available utilizing existing established agreements.

The EEA Agreement governs the Single Market (and wider EEA)

The operation of the Single Market (and wider EEA) is set by the EEA Agreement, to which all Member States of the EU and EFTA (excluding Switzerland) are signatories. For the EFTA/EEA members, the EEA Agreement is amended by the addition of Annexes and Protocols.  Thus the EFTA countries have bespoke variations on the basic EEA Agreement. EFTA countries also have greater flexibility since powers retained by individual EFTA countries have often been removed from the individual Member States of the EU and transferred to the European Commission or its agencies (acting for the whole EU).  Consequently EU Member States often find they cannot act unilaterally, whilst individual EFTA countries can do so and they make use of this freedom to serve their interests.

Within the EEA Agreement Freedom of Movement is Unilaterally Controllable

The Single Market (and wider EEA), has free movement of goods, persons, services and capital as basic principles. However, the EEA Agreement also includes an opt-out which can be applied unilaterally by EFTA countries (see Chapter 4, Safeguard Provisions, Article 112), but obviously not by Members States of the EU.  It states:

Safeguard Provisions, Article 112

  1. If serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising, a Contracting Party may unilaterally take appropriate measures under the conditions and procedures laid down in Article 113.
  2. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Agreement.
  3. The safeguard measures shall apply with regard to all Contracting Parties.

This opt-out is intended to be “temporary” (until a permanent solution is implemented), but nevertheless can be invoked and maintained in the absence of that permanent solution.  It has already been used by Liechtenstein to control immigration and Iceland to control capital flows in the wake of the financial crisis.

The EU’s Ability to Unilaterally Control Freedom of Movement

So useful and/or essential does the EU regard Articles 112 and 114 of the EEA Agreement that, rather than them being toothless window-dressing, it chose to include them virtually unchanged in its draft Withdrawal Agreement, Article 13 (Protocols NI) which states:

Article 13 Safeguards

  1. If the application of this Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties liable to persist, the Union or the United Kingdom may unilaterally take appropriate measures. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol.
  2. If a safeguard measure taken by the Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, in accordance with paragraph 1 creates an imbalance between the rights and obligations under this Protocol, the Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, may take such proportionate rebalancing measures as are strictly necessary to remedy the imbalance. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol.

The EU is intentionally ensuring, whether the UK is in the EEA or not, that the EU can unilaterally restrict immigration into the remaining Member States from the UK. The EU is also agreeing here that the UK can unilaterally restrict immigration from the remaining Member States into the UK.

Implementing the Safeguard Measures Immediately

In the UK, there are permanent economic, infrastructural and societal factors which would justify implementing the existing Safeguard Measures immediately, as of 29th March 2019, when we supposedly leave the EU whilst de facto remaining within the Single Market.  Subsequently it would be prudent to negotiate the introduction of specific clauses to enshrine a right to permanent or longer term control.

Why the untruths about Free Movement?

The kindest explanation as to why Freedom of Movement is misrepresented is that many politicians are actually being economical with the truth, and are avoiding the fuller picture which contradicts their claims.  They may also fail to understand the subtleties of that fuller picture.   This is somewhat obvious in Mrs May’s Lancaster House speech 17th January 2017 where she appears to have accepted some very disingenuous claims about free movement. Here are her words:

But I want to be clear. What I am proposing cannot mean membership of the single market.

European leaders have said many times that membership means accepting the ‘4 freedoms’ of goods, capital, services and people. And being out of the EU but a member of the single market would mean complying with the EU’s rules and regulations that implement those freedoms, without having a vote on what those rules and regulations are. It would mean accepting a role for the European Court of Justice that would see it still having direct legal authority in our country.

Mrs May also appears to fail to understand how the EU and EEA works, including the subordination of the European Court of Justice. These are explained in more detail here with links to further information.

The great tragedy of missed opportunity

This country desperately needs the powers to choose who we should let in and under what circumstances. This was one of the loudest great messages from the Brexit Referendum result. Voters want us to be able to control our borders. To repeat, that power of control is there in legal texts. It could have been grasped by Mrs May and her colleagues in government if they had chosen to do so.   They have chosen – at least up to now – instead a path of uncertainty, cave-ins to the EU and potential chaos.  It is a price the British people should not have to bear.

Is the single market expanding?

With Mrs May having decided to leave the Single Market (and wider European Economic Area, EEA), it could be critical to know if it poses a long term existential threat to our future as a global trading nation.  Whilst in a formal sense the EEA will contract after Brexit, it actually wields considerable informal influence over much global trade. Ignore its ramifications at your peril.  Could then Mrs May’s government, having decided to leave on somewhat disingenuous grounds, that the four freedoms are indivisible, be unaware of this less obvious consequence?

What is the Single Market (or wider EEA)?

The Single Market provides a common mandatory regulatory framework of European Union (EU) directives (laws), standards, compliance or conformity assessment and market surveillance for many products under a centralised legalistic bureaucratic framework. Thus the quality, safety, environmental impact, energy consumption, and integration with other products can meet common (harmonised) criteria; commonly known as Essential Requirements in directives based on the New or Global Approach.  Failure to demonstrate compliance with the Essential Requirements or acceptable (harmonised) standards can prevent a product being placed on the market (in the Single Market or wider EEA) or cause it to be withdrawn.   Demonstrating compliance may require independent conformity assessment and certification; typically carried out by independent test houses and qualified notified bodies (Nobos) which in turn are regulated ultimately by the European Commission (or designated agency).  (Further information on the EEA see here, here and associated links)

What is a product or service?

Unsurprisingly any product and service is much more than just a collection of parts with some kind of functionality. Those parts, materials comprising those parts, associated services, design, production, testing and inspection processes all have to comply with recognisable and authoritative standards.  Whether it is an automobile or safety shoes, there will be standards and reliable means to ensure their compliance, often with some form of mandatory regulation or control.  The alternative to these arrangements is very much the Caveat Emptor principle and an inability to benefit from the accumulated experience of producers, regulators and users.  Costs can also be higher because of a lack of standardisation.

Not all export markets are the same

Some export markets and customers for certain products and services can be very sophisticated, featuring well-developed regulatory frameworks, facilities and knowledgeable, competent, in-house resources. Then it is a matter of complying with their requirements, their specified standards and their regulatory framework.  To offer non-compliant alternatives in the hope that they will be acceptable is to court losing the work to fully-compliant competitors.   However, some exports markets and customers need to rely on external resources and guidance from larger and well-refined markets.  This reliance can be very subtle and render otherwise generally acceptable suppliers and products uncompetitive, or exclude them completely from the market.

The March of Global Standards and the Single Market

Globally accepted standards are great facilitators of international trade.  Where a product is quite complex it certainly helps to know that is complies with standards that you (or the local regulatory authorities) are already familiar with and can trust.   In reality many standards are produced by international bodies and are the same in the UK, Japan or Germany, with perhaps minor national variations. There is also considerable interchange between European Standards (Euronorms) and International Standards.  Hence the expansion of International Standards effectively to supersede national standards and fill obvious needs.

Somewhat less obvious, mandatory regulation is also expanding and effectively following the lead of the more advanced practices.  The Single Market (and wider EEA) is the home of many businesses which are well versed in working to International and European Standards and which follow well-refined conformity and regulatory practices, thus making it somewhat of a low risk trend-setter.  The European Commission is also happy if others (particularly individual non-EU countries) follow its lead (The Brussels Effect), while for those planning to join the EU, it is necessary to do so.  Also, there can be formal agreements which effectively extend the EU’s mandatory regulatory practices into particular products and markets outside the EEA. In summary, it is a complex, ever evolving subject.

World-leading product but still  excluded from an export market

It is not surprising, therefore, to be confronted in an export market with a plethora of well-known European and/or International Standards, along with conformity assessment or regulation modelled on EU/EEA practices.  Such imitation can extend as far as using documentation that in part has clearly been re-badged from previous use inside the EEA; it keeps the costs and risks of preparation down.  It can also be advantageous to reputable organisations to point out that they vigorously follow these often high and demanding, standards and practices, while at the same time being  ‘outside the loop’ can be detrimental to other companies.

Vendors/Suppliers don’t argue with potential customers in export markets

Being ‘unfairly’ excluded from profitable business rarely leads to robust or legal challenges against the potential customer by the unsuccessful vendor; as a minimum, very deep pockets are needed which  small enterprises obviously do not possess.  It is even rarer for unsuccessful vendors eventually to win the work after having caused delays, bad feeling and extra costs.  Once excluded because of non-conformity it is difficult and costly for a company to get back into its given export market again. This is especially the case with capital goods or complex products; re-design, re-testing and conformity re-assessment don’t come cheap.

The Invisible Competitor

The subtle influence of the Single Market (and wider EEA) extends far beyond the borders of its Member States.  This extent of that influence is impossible to determine. Even knowing it is there usually requires considerable perception, industry knowledge and exposure to the export markets involved.  Yet this influence can make it more difficult or even impossible for organisations (especially smaller enterprises) that don’t follow the EEA’s standards, conformity assessment and regulatory practices to do business in some export markets.

In future, unless there is a re-think of the Government’s Brexit policy,  the UK may face problems in accessing some highly attractive export markets outside mainland Europe because of the reach of the Single Market and EEA.