Re-taking our place in the world

At least a third of voters always planned on leaving the EU and were not going to be persuaded otherwise. This didn’t happen on the back of something written on a bus. This was cumulative. For many the final straw was the Lisbon Treaty which was in effect an EU constitution giving it a legal personality in world affairs.

For something that so radically changed our relationship with what was (and still is) viewed as a trade relationship, it should have been put to a referendum. That our political establishment set about ratifying it, using any means at their disposal to dodge a referendum, was evidence of a political establishment which had long since given up any sense of obligation to seek consent when acting in regard to the EU.

What compounds that act was the fact that those who voted for it had very little idea what they were agreeing to. Remainers often complain that there was no impact assessment for Brexit, yet where was the comprehensive national debate over ratifying Lisbon?

We leavers warned that Lisbon would make EU membership all but impossible to reverse – and to an extent we were right. Brexit is no easy feat – and to do it properly will take more than a decade. Our main concern at the time was that the EU is a long term project which gathers its powers by stealth, creeping ever more toward a federalist entity.

Where possible I have tended to avoid the term “European superstate” largely because that kind of terminology lands you in kipper territory where that kind of hackneyed rhetoric is an instant turn off. But that is exactly what the EU is and though remainers can nominally say that we retain our sovereignty, the question is over what? – and for how much longer?

In that regard you have to look up the chain to see how this affects the UK. As we continue to argue, the centre of the regulatory universe is increasingly Geneva, not Brussels – where the WTO TBT agreement provides the foundation of a global regulatory union.

Critics point out that implementation of this is hotly disputed and that its installation is piecemeal and subject to a number of registered exceptions, but like the EU, it is not the status quo that concerns us, rather it is the direction of travel.

While I have always been opposed to trade being an occupied field, the nature of trade agreements is changing, encompassing ever more regulatory measures extending far beyond what we would traditionally call a trade barrier. In order to eliminate distortions in labour, for example the shipping industry using Filipino slave labour, we increasingly adopt International Labour Organisation conventions in trade agreements.

Superficially there is no reason for alarm but what this means in practice is that for the EU to continue with trade exclusivity it must assume exclusive competence over areas not traditionally concerned with trade. In order to tie up these loose ends and overlaps there will eventually be a need for a new EU treaty which involves another substantial transfer of powers. But in the meantime, the ECJ will be the instrument of integration, confiscating ever more powers by the back door.

The eventual destination in this is the deletion of EU member states as independent actors on any of the global forums, with access to them controlled exclusively by Brussels. We would no longer have a voice in our own right and being bound to the EU customs code we would cease to be an independent country in all the ways that matter. This, to me, is why Brexit is absolutely necessary and the high price is one worth paying.

Remainers would argue that we still maintain significant influence by way of being an EU member. Superficially this is correct and Brexit will, temporarily, lead to a loss of influence. But whose influence is it anyway? We are told that the UK was instrumental in pushing for EU expansion. That remains a bad idea and accession states will remain in a state of limbo until such a point as there is a major political or financial crisis – or they leave of their own accord.

But this goes back to the opening premise. It’s no good to say that we have influence in Europe if we have no influence over our government. What remainers say when they say “we” have influence, they mean our permissive, unaccountable, political élites have influence – but actually only in those instances where their ambitions are in alignment with the ideology of the EU.

As much as Brexit is about severing the political integration of the EU, it is also a slapdown for our political class who have never had any intention of seeking consent – and where the EU is concerned, will tell any lie to that end.

In a lot of respects the classic arguments against the EU are legacy complaints where the damage cannot be undone. Leaving the EU does not reverse or remedy what was done to us and for the most part the UK has adapted to the new paradigm. What concerns us is whether there are the necessary safeguards to prevent yet more sweeping changes in the face of globalisation.

We are told that trade liberalisation is good for us – and on a philosophical and technical level I’m not going to argue, but on the human level, it has consequences that directly impact our lives.  This is something we should have a say in, be it opening our markets to American agriculture or letting market forces eat away at our steel industry. There are strategic concerns as well as the economic – and a dogmatic adherence to the principles of free trade is dangerous.

In recent times we have seen EU trade deals derailed because of concerns like chlorine washed chickens, but one suspects this is largely motivated by an inherent anti-Americanism, and were these topics included in any other trade agreement, nobody would have ever uttered the phrase “chlorinated chicken” – and we’d already be eating it.

The fact is that too much is going on out of sight and out of mind. Brexit is a remedy to that. We have already seen a robust debate on the shape of a future UK-US agreement and I fully expect other deals to come under similar scrutiny. I know the powerful UK agriculture lobby will be watching very closely indeed.

As much as Brexit is necessary as a defensive measure against hyper-globalisation, it is also about restoring the UK as an independent actor. As far as most people are concerned, foreign policy is just who we decide who to drop bombs on and who to dole out humanitarian aid. This is what happens when trade, a crucial element of foreign policy, is broken out of policy making and farmed out to the EU. It leaves all the strands of foreign policy happening in abstract to any coherent agenda while removing one of the more useful leverage tools.

Brexit is a means of reintegrating all of these separate strands so that we can have an effective presence on the world stage without seeking a convoluted compromise through Brussels – assuming we can get permission to act at all. The best part of it is that it does not preclude close cooperation with the EU. Obviously Brexit does not give us a free hand and our legacy ties with the EU will be a constraint, but it opens the way for more imaginative approaches than cumbersome EU FTAs.

One overlooked facet of the Brexit debate is that it gives us the opportunity to reconfigure a lot of the agreements we already have via the EU. In most respects, carrying over EU deals need not be a great headache, not least since we are maintaining existing schedules – but it’s the extras we can reappraise. In the EU-Singapore agreement there is a dedicated section on renewable energy – largely reproducing WTO tract. We could either enhance or delete these sections, establishing new joint ventures and working parities, including a number of sectors not touched on by the EU.

This need not happen in competition with the EU, rather it can be a complimentary strategy where one of Europe’s trading powers is free to explore avenues which could potentially benefit all of the EU. Having a major trading nation not bound by the bureaucratic inertia of the EU could well be a secret weapon for Brussels. That would make future EU-UK relations a strategic partnership rather than a subordinate relationship. There is no reason why Brexit cannot be mutually beneficial. All it takes is a little bit of vision.

On the EU side, there has been some posturing too

Mrs May and some members of her team have gone on record to say “No deal is better than a bad deal”, but realistically, “no deal” was never an option. The worst scenario would have been an incomplete, partial deal and with neither side wanting a cliff-edge scenario in March 2019, even this would not be anyone’s preferred option. For all the dire warnings of Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s former Finance Minister, the UK is not Greece.  We would suffer more than EU-27 from a non-deal, but it would not be in the EU’s interests to be obstructive and prevent an agreement being signed.

To prove the point, it is now emerging that some of the tough rhetoric from the EU side which we heard in the immediate post-referendum period has turned out to be little more than posturing. Barely three months ago, it was widely reported that Spain would be given  a right of veto over the final deal with the UK and would have the full support of the other EU member states if it chose to take a tough line over Gibraltar. Recently, however, Alfonso Dastis, Spain’s Foreign Minister,  has stated that his country will not block any Brexit deal and that talks over Gibraltar’s future will be handled on a bilateral basis. “The issue of Gibraltar doesn’t have to be the first, nor the most important point during talks,” he said.

Another example of hot air is the EU’s apparent desire to remove the lucrative €uro clearing business from the City of London to somewhere within the Eurozone.  This would have been a political gesture rather than an economic necessity. After all, most clearing in the Saudi Riyal takes place in London without any heart-searching in Riyadh. Writing in City AM, however, Mark Field, the City of London’s MP claims that “All of the EU politicians and financiers I have spoken to understand that this is a risk not worth taking. They express no desire to prevent euro-denominated trades from being cleared in London and indeed privately rail against the notion that such business might be forcibly moved to Paris.” He also points out that “Most sensible players implicitly understand that if London is undermined, key participants in the financial services industry will move not to Frankfurt, Dublin or Paris but to New York, Singapore or Shanghai.” Absolutely. In or out of the EU, London  will remain Europe’s principal centre for financial services for the foreseeable future.

On the surface, however, it does appear that the EU has turned the corner after its recent problems. Its economy is performing better than at any time since the Great Recession of 2008 and eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands and France failed to make any breakthrough in recent elections. France’s new President, Emmanuel Macron, is a strong supporter of the EU and his triumph is encouraging the Eurozone to consider pressing on with further integration. Even Germany’s ever-cautious Angela Merkel recently indicated that she would “consider a common finance minister, if the circumstances are right,” adding “we could also consider a Eurozone budget if it is clear that we are really strengthening the structure of the economy and doing sensible things”. 

Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, has also adopted a very upbeat note in his invitation to the EU’s leaders for the next meeting. “It is fair to say that we will meet in a different political context from that of a few months ago, when the anti-EU forces were on the rise. The current developments on the continent seem to indicate that we are slowly turning the corner. In many of our countries, the political parties that have built their strength on anti-EU sentiments are beginning to diminish. We are witnessing the return of the EU rather as a solution, not a problem.”

There is a big “but”, however. A recent survey by Chatham House, a foreign policy think tank, pointed to a wide gap between the opinions of the EU’s “élite” (defined as leading figures from politics, media, business and civil society) and the general public and even the élite is not as optimistic as Mr Tusk’s words would have us believe.  Only 34% of the public feel they have benefitted from the EU, compared with 71% of the élite while a majority of the public (54%) think their country was a better place to live 20 years ago, which in some cases means before their country joined the EU.

The study also finds 48% of the public wants the EU to hand back powers to member states, while only 31% of the élite are keen on this idea. Less than 1 in 4 of the general public support extra powers for the EU and even among the élite, the figure is a mere 37%. What is more, among the élite, almost one in two (46%) thinks that another country will leave the EU within the next decade. The figure for the general public is 58%.

While the groundwork for the survey was undertaken between December 2016 and February 2017 – in other words, before the Dutch and French elections – it still painted a rather fragile picture of the EU, suggesting that Donald Tusk’s comments may be somewhat over-optimistic. To prove the point, less than a week after Macron’s triumph, several members of his cabinet have already quit. If plans for further Eurozone integration do fall foul of public opinion, any revival of enthusiasm for the EU project among the general public may prove short-lived.

None of this reduces the challenges facing the UK government in the Brexit negotiations. Indeed some have argued that a strong EU may be more willing to grant a favourable deal to the UK than one which believes itself to be on the back foot. What we can say is that it is far from certain that the UK’s negotiators will necessarily spend all the next 21 months facing representatives of an organisation which is self-confident or even united.

Photo by D-Stanley

EU unemployment could be higher than the official figures

A study by the European Central Bank has suggested that the real level of unemployment in the European Union may be higher than the official figures.  If the numbers of underemployed and unemployed people in the Eurozone are added together, it apparently amounts to between 15% and 18% of the total workforce.

France and Italy in particular have not seen the slow recovery within the Eurozone translate into reduced levels of unemployment. Bert Colijn, a senior economist at the Dutch bank ING, estimates that in Italy, the total of the underemployed and unemployed may be as high as 30%.

In total, five million jobs have allegedly been created across the EU since the 2008 financial crisis, but many are part-time or temporary. This means that wage growth is pretty anaemic in many EU member states.

This report, if true, paints a very bleak picture indeed for some EU member states, as the official data is pretty grim. The youth unemployment rate in Greece stood at 48% in January. In Spain, it hit 56.1% in April 2013, but by March 2017, it had fallen to 40.5% – still two in five young people. The figures for Italy and France were 34.1% and 23.7% respectively. By contrast, in Germany, the figure was 6.7% and the overall unemployment rate a mere 3.9%.

These figures highlight the flawed nature of the single currency. The Germans insisted on a “strong” €uro as the price for surrendering the Deutschmark. They have ended up gaining a very profitable export market for their goods on their very doorstep. Meanwhile, the Mediterranean countries are suffering.

Given that, on the one hand the current state of affairs is going to continue to keep unemployment high in these countries while on the other, Germany would have considerable say in any moves towards further integration within the Eurozone, the prospects for their struggling neighbours to the south are unlikely to  improve any time soon.

The plan for a new EU Constitution proves Britain is right to get out now

In Japan, so I am informed by people who know these things, there is a genre of activity known as Tamakeri.

Readers are advised not to Google that on their office computer: it involves individuals getting pleasure from being kicked in their chestnuts, or watching that happen to some other poor unfortunate individual.

Each to their own. But it appears that despite the obvious risks and consequences, some in the EU are determined to engage on their own political equivalent.

Supporters of continental integration have already forgotten the lessons that led to Brexit, and are determined to push ahead with further trips to referendum A&E. On go the sturdy boots. A new EU Constitution is now doing the rounds.

Of course, no one in their right mind could possibly revert to a concept that was so beyond the pale it caused two of the founding EEC states to reject it in a referendum. So, naturally, there is a draft which is even more integrationist instead. Like a classic Hammer Horror, the undead Constitution has risen for the sequel, and this time it means business.

We explore the background (less the Tamakeri) in a new paper for the Red Cell, The Ljubljana Initiative. In short, some old school academics in the Balkans have latterly drafted a text that borrows heavily from the US constitution. It might have stayed on Slovenian shelves gathering dust and waiting for the planets to align, but they have got their President on board, who is even now touring chancelleries pushing the document as the hard text of the ‘more integration’ option recently mooted by Jean-Claude Juncker.

It thus appears to be the only one of his five options that has a concrete set of proposals to go with it. Even if it doesn’t get selected as the Council’s preferred route, it shifts the fulcrum: it will make all the other models that will emerge seem perfectly modest and acceptable by comparison.

So why is it such a shocker? Well, as our paper explores in greater depth, there are three core issues: things that get changed in how the EU works; things that get changed in what the EU does; and the creation of a fast lane for further integration.

Let’s start with functionality. The constitution becomes openly federal so the EU becomes a sovereign government and an international player in its own right, and Brussels formally becomes Europe’s Washington DC. Power shifts from member states, as the Council becomes QMV-driven. The Delors proposal is adopted that made Thatcher say “No! No! No!”: power shifts massively away from governments towards MEPs in the model of the US Congress.

Meanwhile, the Euroquangos become subject to the souped-up President, who can make new ones whenever he wants. As for the European Court of Justice, it formally becomes the EU Supreme Court, subject to MEP – and not national – oversight.

The two big winners are the MEPs, and the lucky new occupant of the EU Presidency. The EU President gets to run international affairs and defence just like the US President does. He appoints ambassadors and judges. Particularly controversially, and ideal given the track record in Brussels, he gains the right to grant Presidential pardons (so, plenty of scope for replays of Nixon after Watergate). A new system meanwhile sets up a Security Council made up of representatives from other EU institutions at times of crisis – generating a ‘War Cabinet’.

These are radical proposals. Realistically, it’s unlikely that member states will be willing to all go along with this, though it would be informative to see the haggling. In any case, we turn to the division of competences (i.e. powers) and this is where the drafters’ prospects start to improve.

Under the text, Foreign Affairs becomes an EU competence. The EU gets its own European Defence Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Even Juncker’s proposals to reduce the role of Brussels included creating a Defence Union, so this certainly has legs.

A new EU territorial police force is also created. Because everyone is such a fan of Casablanca, obviously that means that a new EU Intelligence Agency Service (an EU CIA) needs to be formed too.

Emphasising the complete failure to learn from June 2016, a new Common European Asylum System is also set out, which is intended to share out asylum seekers.

Then on top of these measures, there are also the proposals intended to make EU integration easier in the future.

There is a new ‘passerelle’ clause, so that if MEPs want the power to do something, and don’t have the express legal right in the treaty, but the general objective is mentioned in the treaty, then MEPs can grant themselves the power to do it. To grapple with the consequences of that, consider for a moment what MEPs might choose to legislate on in order to ‘bring peace to Europe’.

On top of that route, there are clauses for fast tracking widespread constitutional change. MEPs can decide they want more powers, summon a Constitutional Convention, and vote themselves those powers. A referendum failure in several member states during ratification still doesn’t veto the result.

Separately, a new Article 50 also incidentally makes it harder for states to leave in the future by transferring the key negotiating role to MEPs.

Some will say that these are merely proposals, and they will be right. These are ideas that are simply being put forward by a Head of State, who is looking for (and incidentally, so he says, winning) support from his counterparts. But let us not forget either how many items now contained in the EU treaties were themselves once dismissed as whispered follies, or on a par perhaps with, say, the Beano, scant years before they indeed came to pass.

So it is important to take note and not to dismiss such plumb lines out of hand. Even if only a part of this new draft EU Constitution happens, the inescapable nature of ever-closer union (contained, incidentally, within the recent reaffirmation in Rome) means that it maps the long term direction of travel. We are at the same time prompted yet again that those engaged in running the EU are incapable of adapting from past mistakes, learning nothing and forgetting nothing.

All told, it proves that the United Kingdom was right to vote to get out when it did. Consider for a moment that, if Brexit is difficult now, what it would be like after another thirty years of plug hole suction on our sovereignty, and matting of our economy’s paperwork.

But above all, the existence of this new EU Constitution alerts us of the importance of strategically thinking ahead.

Theresa May, David Davis, and all ministers and team leaders across Whitehall need to plan over the long term. They need to look at what the EU will over future decades become, rather than think about how they want to associate with the structures that are in place today. That way, they can avoid creating new institutional ties that are so close that they mire their successors as the EU construction site continues to fill with cement.

(this article first appeared on Brexit Central and is used with permission.)

Donald Tusk (not Trump!) Reminds us why we voted to leave

We will not be providing you with a blow-by-blow commentary on the progress of the European Union (Notification of withdrawal) Bill as we believe that, in spite of opposition from the Lib Dems, the SNP, some Labour MPs and Ken Clarke, it will complete its passage through Parliament in time for Mrs May’s deadline of 9th March when the government will formally trigger Article 50.  There will be plenty of press coverage and analysis for people wanting to follow the Bill’s progress through both houses of Parliament but this website will confine itself occasional comment on the key moments of the Bill’s progress. We will also be monitoring which MPs support and which oppose the will of the people.

Of more immediate interest is a speech by Donald Tusk, the President of the  European Council, which provided a welcome reminder why we voted to leave. In order to understand where Mr Tusk is coming from, we need to remember that next month marks 60 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which formally inaugurated what has become the European Union. Naturally, the EU wants to celebrate this milestone but we pesky Brits have already spoiled their party with Brexit and, to add insult to injury, the USA has voted for a president who, in the words of Ted Malloch, the new US ambassador to the EU, “doesn’t like an organisation that is supranational, that is unelected where the bureaucrats run amok and that is not frankly a proper democracy.”

So what was Mr Tusk’s response?  The answer is – guess what – More Europe! “We must therefore take assertive and spectacular steps that would change the collective emotions and revive the aspiration to raise European integration to the next level”, he said. Yes, he means further integration. Just to make sure no one could be in any doubt, he also added “If we do not believe in ourselves, in the deeper purpose of integration, why should anyone else? In Rome we should renew this declaration of faith.”

He did not go into much detail about how integration was to proceed, There was no mention of fiscal or monetary union within the Eurozone, although he did talk of “strengthening the foreign policy of the EU as a whole.” Brexit received only a very oblique mention when he claimed that “the disintegration of the European Union will not lead to the restoration of some mythical, full sovereignty of its member states, but to their real and factual dependence on the great superpowers: the United States, Russia and China. Only together can we be fully independent.”

Why could no EU member state be fully sovereign? On which superpower is New Zealand, with a population less than one eighth of Mr Tusk’s native Poland “really and factually” dependent? Or Australia, India, St Helena, South Africa or Morocco, to name a few countries at random.

There is a particular irony in this statement given that many EU member states are also members of NATO and have been accused, with good reason, by President Trump of being too dependent on the USA for their protection.

Tusk complained about “Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine” without the slightest mention that the EU must take the blame for the current state of that country by fermenting opposition to a democratically-elected leader.

He also complained that, faced with “national egoism….becoming an attractive alternative to integration”, the pro-European élites (his own term, may I add) were suffering from “a decline of faith in political integration.”

In other words, it’s the same old message, underpinned with the belief that if it is repeated sufficiently, it will convince the doubters. Tusk’s political rival Jaroslaw Kaczynski, however, is unlikely to be impressed. The leader of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party has called not for more integration but for the very opposite- a new treaty which would return power to the member states. “The vision of the EU forced upon us by the Lisbon Treaty has failed”, he said.

Thinking back to this time last year, we will recall that David Cameron went to Brussels asking for something similar – a return of some power back to the UK. He came away with only a few crumbs which ultimately didn’t sway the voters and we wisely voted to leave.

Neither Poland nor fiercely EU-critical Hungary looks likely to follow us out of the door at the moment, but Mr Tusk’s words were those of a man who realises that supporters of the European project are on the back foot at the moment. Unfortunately for him, the determination he expressed to carry on ploughing the same old furrow is unlikely to address the growing disillusion with the project across a number of EU member states.

“If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging” goes the old saying and there is much wisdom in it. Unfortunately, Mr Tusk and his friends in Brussels seem both unable and unwilling to turn their digger off.

Photo by Glueckstadt

Fisheries Part 9:- Repairing the damage requires careful planning

To recap: Some politicians knew right from the start that the CFP amounted to a betrayal of our fishermen

When National Fishery limits were extended from the 3 nautical mile limit to 12 and then 200/median line in the 1960s and 1970s, British boats which formerly fished far away from the UK found themselves squeezed out of their traditional grounds from the Grands Banks, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Russia. The middle water fleet likewise found itself excluded from Faroese waters.

Under normal circumstances, our fishermen would have been compensated for this loss of access by being given exclusive rights to our new UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 miles/median line. Instead, however, the Westminster Parliament decided to give the people’s resource away. They blocked that option and instead of supporting our own industry, preferred to let the fishing fleets of other EU member states catch most of the fish in what are our waters. Now, a visit to many fishing ports around the UK coast will reveal all too clearly the devastation and decline this policy has caused.

John Silkin, the Labour Fisheries Minister did all he could in 1977-8 to try and obtain a British exclusive 50 nautical mile zone, but as he stated in a House of Commons statement on 19th. January 1978, “There was considerable opposition to my demands on this question on the basis that they were contrary to the Treaty of Accession”.

How often have we heard that? “Go and read the Treaties!” It will be a huge relief when Article 50 is finally invoked, as two years later the EU Treaties will cease to apply to the UK.

Five years later on 25th January 1983, Regulation 170/83 had just come into force, which introduced the percentage share out of all individual species, known in the trade as “Relative Stability”, which the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher hailed a great success. Six days later, however, Peter Walker, the fisheries minister, painted a different picture:- “The reality is that if the United Kingdom, instead of demanding anything like the historic proportion of Europe’s fish that it had caught, demanded a 200-mile limit and 50 per cent. or 60 per cent. of Europe’s fish, that would mean the massive destruction of the fishing industries of most of our friends and partners in western Europe.”

In other words, it was anything but a success for our fishermen, although wonderful news for the fleets of other EU member states.

As has been pointed out before in these articles, the quota system was part of the political integrationist agenda. The commitment to the creation of an United States of Europe was far more important that introducing a fisheries policy built on sensible conservation practise. Each member state was given a quota for each species which the National Governments then distributed among their own fleet.

Why, however, did our government allow our allocation to gain a monetary value? Goodness knows, unless they knew that such action would end up with the allocated resource coming into the hands of a favoured few – including foreign hands – and thus getting rid of British vessels in order to comply with our Treaty obligations.

Non-EU quota based systems are not the answer  

Brexit provides us with an historic opportunity to repair the damage which EU membership has done to our fishing industry. Recently, a number of well-intentioned articles and reports have been published on this subject, written by persons with no sea-going fishing experience. The net result has been a number of proposals which, sadly, are of little if any value.

For instance, knowing that Iceland and Norway are not in the EU and have large fishing fleets, some pieces are proposing that an independent UK uses their fisheries management system as a template. Unfortunately, their assumption that a non-EU country would automatically operate a better fisheries management system has proved misplaced. Both Norway and Iceland operate quota systems and thus their fishing industry has suffered similar social consequences – small family businesses have been forced out of the profession, affecting entire coastal communities.

Statistical and factual confusion

This is not the only mistake in some fisheries proposals. The Adam Smith Institute made a mistake in its fisheries proposal with the chronology of the introduction to the 200 mile/median point zone.

Statistics is another area which also needs to be handled carefully. Lumping all the sectors of the fishing industry together is confusing, as within a single heading are several different sectors, from small boats operating near the shore to large deep-water trawlers using different methods of fishing.

So, to take the 2015 Eurostat statistics on overall vessel tonnage, Spain is shown as having double the tonnage of both France and ourselves, whereas statistics based on overall engine power of the total fleet shows Spain and ourselves having only 75% the engine power of the French fleet. This is because different vessels of different horsepower are used for different types of fishing.

Confusion can also occur when considering the tonnage of species caught, as you can catch huge numbers of some species which have relatively little value, whereas with some species, there is great value in small tonnage.

The overall tonnage taken, (in thousands of tonnes) per nation in 2015 was:-

Norway 2146

Iceland  1317

Spain 901

UK 701

France  497

Even given the caveat about the different value of different species, these figures show the massive potential out there. The tonnage for an independent UK, free from the fetters of the CFP, should be the same or better than Norway.

Things get even more complicated if one attempts to calculate how many fish the other EU member states take out of the UK zone, because figures of the percentage share amongst the member states per area zone is broken down by species. The UK may catch as many as 90% of the total catch of one individual species in our own EEZ but as little as 10% of another. Realistically, the figure is about 40% overall, which mean that vessels from other EU member states take 60% of what is the British people’s resource. France has admitted up to 70% of its total catch comes from the British EEZ.

No other EU Member State gave away its own resources to the degree that we did.  We cannot continue to do this, but on the other hand, if on Independence Day, we swung to the opposite extreme and allowed no EU vessel in our waters, the consequences would be dramatic and damaging. What is required is a transitional time-limited process. Fortunately, on Independence Day, when the Treaties and Regulations cease to apply, we will revert back to our Fishery Limits 1976 Act, which functions under UNCLOS  111, through article 62

Utilization of the living resources

  1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61.
  2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70.

This is a way whereby a transfer of operations could be fairly moved across in a time-limited period, with no permanent right of access conceded.

In my final article, I will look at the benefits  and potential of Brexit fisheries, but it must not be forgotten what Theresa May said in her Conference speech on 2nd October: The authority of EU law in Britain will end. This,after all, is what Brexit is about.

We trust that we can take her at her word and that the future of the British people’s resource and the revitalisation of our fishing industry and coastal communities rests in the hands of our elected representatives at Westminster and no one else.