Macron’s victory may create more problems than it solves

Emmanuel Macron campaigned for – and indeed, won – the French Presidential election on an unashamedly pro-EU platform. His victory was greeted with huge sighs of relief across the Continent. Rather ironically, however, his enthusiasm for the Single Currency and indeed the European project as a whole may have the opposite effect, as John Stepek pointed out in a recent edition of Moneyweek magazine.

At the heart of the problem is that when it comes to further integration within the EU and in particular, the single currency area, it is far easier to talk the talk than walk the walk.

A broad range of economists acknowledge that so many economically divergent nations pushing ahead with a single currency in the 1990s was far from ideal. If a monetary union is to work, fiscal and political union, while not prerequisites, certainly reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure. As it currently stands, the Eurozone is far from being an optimal currency area.

This is exactly the line Macron has been taking. In other words, as Stepek puts it, “He’s one of the rare pro-eurozone politicians who’s actually quite honest about the euro and the eurozone. He is calling openly for a much closer Europe. He reckons that Europe needs a common budget, a common banking system – effectively, a full-blown United States of Europe.”

Any French politician who has made such a proposal in the past has been fobbed off by Berlin with the curt instructions to put their own house in order first. Reforms to France’s generous pension arrangements, bloated public sector and short working week have been often proposed by a number of newly-elected Presidents only to be scuppered by tyre-burning, stone-throwing protesters backed by France’s powerful trade unions.

But just suppose Macron succeeds where his predecessors have come to grief. Even a streamlined French economy will take years to converge with Germany’s and then, what about Italy or Greece? Following Macron’s victory, the headline in the Bild newspaper, which Stepek describes as the rough German equivalent of the Sun, was “How expensive will Macron be for us?”

This is not just the heart of the Eurozone’s problem – it highlights a major stumbling block with the whole European project. Germany has been happy to be a net contributor to the EU’s funds via the EU budget. In some ways, it would be very churlish of the Germans to moan about this. Labour market reforms in the first decade of the 21st Century made German businesses more competitive and the single currency also made German goods relatively cheap in other Eurozone countries. Italy and Spain, habitual devaluers before adopting the Euro, have lost this option. Unable to weaken their currency and thus boost their export markets, businesses in these countries have failed to compete with the Germans.

The unemployment figures bear this out. Only 3.9% of working age Germans are out of work and youth unemployment was a mere 6.7% in March. The corresponding figures for Italy are 11.7% and 34.1%. Spain and Greece are even worse, with overall unemployment at 18.8% and 23.2% respectively and more than two out of every five young people out of work in both countries.

Closer fiscal union means that not only would German taxpayers be paying into the EU budget to rebuild the infrastructure of the former Soviet bloc countries, but they would be liable for the social security and pension benefits of unemployed and retired Greeks, Italians and Spaniards. At the same time, a banking union would increase German liabilities if an Italian bank went bust. In short, it would be all pain for the average German (who is doing very nicely out of the Euro) with very little gain.

But surely the gain would be the big step towards full political integration which has always been the goal of the EU project? We are now getting to the heart of a fundamental flaw in the whole federalist vision. The idea of an United States of Europe may have been appealing in the late 1940s when everyone was keen to find a format which would prevent another world war. The problem is that while certain intellectuals, particularly on the political left, have long had an internationalist outlook, ordinary men and women are far more attached to the concept of nationhood and ethnicity, even though they may not even be aware of how deep that attachment runs.

But the subject of fiscal transfers, along with the related issues of benefits and welfare, can be guaranteed to bring such sentiments out into the open. Even in the United States of America, there is considerable resistance in some states to a European-style welfare state – and significantly, the states in question are the most ethnically diverse. It seems to be hard-wired into our nature that we are more willing to make sacrifices for people who are “one of us” than for people we perceive to be different.

A German, whose public sector employees have to work well into their 60s, is therefore unlikely to take kindly to subsidising the pensions of Greek public sector workers, many of whom used to retire in their 50s. But Greek austerity is biting impossibly hard. At our Annual CIB rally, Ambassador Chrysanthopoulos told us that his own pension had been cut from 3,400 euros per month to 1,200. If the recently announced cut of a further eighteen per cent applies to him, he will be down to under 1,000 euros a month – and he reckons himself lucky! So real hatred for Germany is building up in Greece, as is impatience with Greece in Germany. The German people may yet find the price of European empire too high while poorer Greek households on the most basic social security are currently receiving around 8 euros per household (not per person) per day. So starvation stalks the land – all in the name of building a European superstate.

An extreme example? Perhaps, but it illustrates graphically the challenges which Macron’s election has brought to the surface. How deeply does the average German, Greek, Frenchman, Swede, Pole, etc  – as opposed to an intellectual or a politician – really love the EU? If the depth of love of the rank and file isn’t strong enough to transcend ethnic and cultural divisions or to be willing to endure financial deprivation and extreme hunger, the only question which Macron, Merkel or their successors will need to consider is how the whole EU project can be put peacefully to sleep without a total political and economic catastrophe.

Photo by Lorie Shaull

Customs Union: from Zollverein to irrelevance

By Ian Milne

Preamble

Orwell’s Nineteen Eight Four came out in 1948, less than a decade before the official birth of the European Community.  In Orwell’s vision, three totalitarian super-states, Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia, were perpetually at war.

The European Community was – is – merely the latest version of the chimera of a single European state that had been pursued in the nineteenth century by writers such as Victor Hugo, by Continental tyrants such as Napoleon, and, in the twentieth century, by German governments led in 1914 by Bethmann-Hollweg  and from 1933 to 1945 by Hitler.

Consciously or not, the European Union was built on similar assumptions: that the post-war world would consist of huge “blocs”, competing for resources & markets, and that European states were destined to amalgamate into a single state. In the Eurocrats’ weltanschauung – world-view – North America constituted one bloc, Europe another, while to the East, (the Soviet Union, its first candidate, having failed) China would exercise hegemony over the Asian land-mass.

The EU Customs Union

Since its accession to the “Common Market”,  “British Trade Policy is not to have a British Trade Policy”. The UK hasn’t been in control of its own trade policy since 1973. What the UK has had since 1973 is being trapped – for the first time in its history – inside a customs union – the EU Customs Union.

The EU Customs Union, the only one in the developed world,  is a relic from the “Fifties” –  the 1850s. This is how it came about.

In  German & French “received wisdom”, customs unions are (still !) a peculiar obsession. The 19th century German customs union – “Zollverein” –  was the mechanism associated in the German collective consciousness with the Bismarckian creation of Prussia & then the German Empire.

On 4th September 1914, a few weeks after the  outbreak of the First World War,  Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg issued his letter setting out German war aims. War aim number four1 was to “create a central European economic association through common customs treaties…….”. (A Figaro journalist, Eric Zemmour, describes this as a plan for the “vassalisation économique” of France through the mechanism of a customs union2.)

Two years later, in 1916, when the war wasn’t going too well for Germany, Berlin offered a separate peace to the Belgian Government (then in exile in Le Havre3), involving the evacuation of German occupying forces from Belgium & the signing of a bi-lateral Belgian-German customs union4.   This was turned down by the Allies.

In early 1917, when a compromise peace with Britain, France and Russia might just have been possible, German aims were for a “German peace” with a customs union led by Germany and with the involvement of Austro-Hungary and Romania, thereby solidifying Germany’s hold over its supposed allies and converting them to a de facto part of the peacetime German economy, no different from Alsace-Lorraine and a large slice of Belgium which Germany also proposed to retain.

In the next war, in 1942, when Germany still believed it would win, the Reichsbank organised a conference5 in Berlin to plan how Germany would run the European economy afterwards.  This involved a European Customs Union – Zollverein – very similar to the one we have today.  (It also involved a single currency with – believe it or not – an opt-out for the UK).

 Almost two centuries on, in 2016, with average customs duties worldwide (including in the UK) down to a little over one per cent6, customs unions have lost whatever economic raison d’etre they ever had.

The EU is likely to experience a significant decline as an important trading partner in the future due to demographic issues. These two Global Britain briefing notes (here and here) list the projections for population growth and decline within and outside the EU. It is particularly interesting to see the very different projections for France and Germany.

Ian Milne

1          The full text (translated) is: “We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland “sic”, and perhaps Italy, Sweden, and Norway.”
2          Eric Zemmour, Figaro, 29.9.16 
3          The building which housed the Belgian government in exile between 1914 & 1918 survived the 1944 bombing & still stands in Saint-Adresse, a suburb of Le Havre.
4          Georges-Henri Soutou, La Grande Illusion, 1914-1920, pp 75.
5         The title of the 1942 conference was “Europäische Wirtshaftsgemeinschaft”
6          In 2013, 82 % by value of all UK imports of goods from outside the EU bore zero customs duties. The remaining 18% of such imports bore an average rate of EU-mandated customs duties of 8%. That 8% average is likely to be lower now.

 

Photo by Polybert49

Britain needs fighting ‘Plan B’ for trade as EU turns screws on Brexit

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. The original first appeared in the Daily Telegraph.

The European Union is hardening its terms on Brexit. There is a new hint of hostility in the language. The tone is peremptory.

Those of us who hoped that Germany would push quietly for an amicable settlement can no longer be so confident. We now learn from Handelsblatt that the German finance ministry insisted on some of the most unfriendly changes to the EU’s latest working documents.

Berlin stipulated that Britain must honour “all obligations” (Verpflichtungen) for divorce payments, a tougher wording than the earlier, gentler talk of legal and budgetary “duties” (Pflichten).

It demanded that Britain desist from tax dumping and financial deregulation that would “jeopardize the stability of the union”. This demand is almost insulting. British regulators have led efforts to recapitalize banks. It is the eurozone and Germany that have dragged their feet on tougher capital rules.

There is no longer any attempt at diplomatic tact. The document states that the European Commission will “determine” when the UK has made “sufficient progress” as it jumps through the hoops, the way it handles accession talks for supplicants hoping to join. It reads like an imperial curia discussing a colony.

The French too have stepped up their demands, insisting that financial services be excluded from the trade deal. The City of London must respect the “regulatory and supervisory standards regime” of the EU in any future arrangement, suggesting that Britain will have to accept the sway of the European Court.

Some argue that France will soften its line under a President Emmanuel Macron. His economic strategist is the anglophile Jean Pisani-Ferry, co-author of a Breugel paper proposing a ‘continental partnership’ between Britain and the EU that preserves very close ties.

Sadly, Mr Pisani-Ferry has made no headway with this idea. I have met Mr Macron enough times – or have seen him at EU venues behind closed doors – to detect a messianic fervour for the European project. He is a crusader by political religion, the EU’s latterday Bernard de Clairvaux.

But it is the hardening mood in Germany that is most ominous. The reason for the sudden change is unquestionably Theresa May’s snap election. While we think that the Prime Minister’s motive is – in part – to build a buffer against Brexit ultras in her own party, that is not the view in Berlin. Germans see her gambit as anti-EU sabre-rattling and a breach of good faith.

“The EU wants to counter Theresa May’s rhetoric and kill the idea that a bigger conservative majority will make any difference to their negotiating position,” said John Springfield from the Centre for European Reform.

The German press has likened Mrs May’s démarche to the defiant posturing of Alexis Tsipras in Greece. They almost take it as a given that her Brexit plan will fail and that she too will be forced to capitulate, grovelling for mercy. One wonders where the briefings are coming from in Berlin.

The parallel with Greece is on one level absurd. Syriza caved after the European Central Bank cut off liquidity and shut down the banking system. Britain is not in the euro or vulnerable to such coercion, and the strategic contours are entirely different.

Yet the Greek saga is instructive. The lesson is that you do not bluff with the EU power structure. If Theresa May still thinks that “no deal is better than a bad deal”, she had better have a credible Plan B, and she must be willing to activate it.

Falling back to the minimalist option of the World Trade Organisation and hoping to craft global trade deals smacks of defeat. It would leave Britain in limbo, pleading with the US, Japan, China, India, and other countries to embark on talks when they have larger matters at hand.

So it is time to think in revolutionary terms.  Parliament’s Exiting the EU Committee called earlier this month for a detailed study of what it would mean if the UK left the EU without a deal. Downing Street should answer this legitimate request, and the menu should include the nuclear option of unilateral free trade.

This is a heady Cobdenite manifesto, a turbo-charged version of the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. No developed country has ever attempted such a thing, though New Zealand comes closest, leaving aside the special cases of Hong Kong and Singapore.

All tariffs would be cut to zero. There would be no restrictions on imports besides obvious safeguards, such as policing child labour or environmental abuses, or for national security reasons.

It needs no reciprocation, working from the premise of Adam Smith that if any other country wishes to impose or maintain barriers that is their own folly. They suffer the welfare loss. The currency would adjust to the new equilibrium, keeping the current account close to balance over time.

Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations laid out the argument that protectionists hurt themselves most

Adam Posen, head of the Peterson Institute in Washington, said Britain would face a rough time with no EU trade deal but at least such a plan has creative allure. “It is far more credible than other options,” he said.

The current dismal narrative on Brexit would be transformed overnight.  Britain would suddenly be seen by the rest of the world as pioneering nation at the forefront of globalism, reasserting Thatcherite audacity, rather than a crabby islanders in decline. “People’s jaws would drop,” says Professor Patrick Minford from Cardiff University.

Pure free trade cuts through the Gordian Knot, eliminating the need for an army of technocrat negotiators and for yet more of those supra-national tribunals that so proliferate, eviscerating democracies and sapping consent for globalism.

Prof Minford says the hide-bound political class has yet to give such clear blue sky proposals a serious airing. “It is so unfamiliar. It takes a mental somersault to break free of mercantilist thinking,” he said.

Economists for Brexit – now Economists for Free Trade – certainly got off on the wrong foot last year by suggesting that the UK would be positively richer under such a model. This invited a blizzard of criticism.

My own view has always been that there will be a negative shock from Brexit and withdrawal from the single market, with effects on GDP at best neutral by 2030 with the right policies.

Professor John Van Reenen, a trade expert at MIT and a vocal critic of the Minford plan, says retreat to the WTO would cost roughly 2.5pc of GDP compared to remaining in the EU, with losses rising over time to 8.5pc due to productivity effects.

Witness to History

LORD WALSINGHAM (now aged 92) was a Third Secretary in the German Department of the British Foreign Office in 1950, when the foundations were being laid for the first stage of what is now the EU. It was then called the European Coal & Steel Community. He was Secretary of the tripartite study group (The UK, USA and France) which  cancelled all denazification to rebuild Germany against communist Russia for the Cold War.

This link is to a youtube video where he recounts his experience (approx 35 minutes)

Whilst the project was ostensibly about securing peace in Europe, British intelligence was well aware that there were secret additional  agreements in the Coal & Steel Treaty between Germany and France to weaken British heavy industry, eventually to undermine Britain’s defence capability so that the European project  would dominate Europe unchallenged in the long term.

Britain did not join the Coal & Steel Community but neither did it make public the ulterior, anti-British intentions of the “Fathers of Europe”. At the time Britain was  heavily indebted to the USA which was backing the EU project and funding the European Movement through the CIA.

The European Coal & Steel Community was intended to lead to a united Franco/German European army but the French National Assembly voted that down. Jean Monnet, Schuman and colleagues decided that they needed to proceed more gradually as the nations of Europe were not then ready to assent to their  dissolution in a single European polity. The European Economic Community was founded on this principle of small, repeated inexorable steps towards “ever closer union”. The process was called “Engrenage” – like a ratchet, it was irreversible. The Treaty of Rome set this up in 1957.

The name “European Economic Community” is highly significant. As a businessman, Monnet well knew the importance of brand loyalty. Every politically aware German of the Nazi era would recognise the  “Europaeische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft”,  set up to build integration between the countries of Europe after the Nazi victory of 1940 and widely publicised in a collection of papers of the same name, published in Berlin in 1942. Translations of the introduction and main paper are available here. Apart from some descriptions of contemporary events, there is nothing in them which has not come out of the EEC and the EU in the last sixty years. The mindset and geopolitical world outlook are virtually identical.

The post war EU’s biggest project by far, the Common Agricultural Policy, was decided in 1962 but it was based on the clear guidelines, laid down twenty years before in Nazi Berlin (link here).  Now, of course, the Nazi EEC turned out to be mostly propaganda because the pressures of war overtook and destroyed it – but many of its intentions, including dominance over central Europe have been carried into effect under the EU flag , since the fall of the Berlin wall.

The Nazis were adapters rather than inventors of the project, which had been on official German minds for generations. On 9 September 1914, the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg wrote:- “Russia must be pushed back as far as possible from Germany’s Eastern frontier and her domination over non-Russian vassal people broken… We must create a Central European Economic Association through common customs treaties to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all members will be formally equal but in practice under German leadership and must stabilise Germany’s dominance over central Europe”.

Monnet, Schuman and colleagues added the “common constitutional supreme authority” in the form of the European Commission but the project is still highly congruent with the remarkably stable, long term objectives of Germany’s political class since the 19th century.

In late 2016 the German government allocated 4 million Euros to an investigation into the influence  of Nazi personalities and policies in the post war era.

Why Brexit should be followed by Irexit

By Anthony Coughlan

The Republic of Ireland joined the then European Economic Community in 1973 primarily because Britain and Northern Ireland did so. Now a group of Irish economists and lawyers of which I was rapporteur have produced a report advocating that Brexit should be accompanied by “Irexit” (Ireland Exit), for a number of decisive reasons.

If the UK leaves the EU customs union while the Republic stays in the EU, the North-South border within Ireland will become an EU land frontier, with customs controls being inevitable and possibly passport controls too. EU-based laws and standards, for example in relation to crime and justice, will prevail in the South and UK-based ones in the North. The only way for the Republic’s politicians to avoid adding new dimensions to the North-South border within Ireland is therefore for them to leave the EU along with the UK.

Since 2014, the Republic has become a net contributor to the EU Budget. This is a big change from the previous 40 years, during which it was a major recipient of EU money, mainly through the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. In future, money from Brussels will be Irish taxpayers’ money recycled, as is already the case with the UK. This removes what up to now has been the principal basis of Irish Europhilia, official and unofficial – namely, easy EU cash, not any ideological enthusiasm for Eurofederalism or “the EU project”.

If the Republic seeks to remain in the EU when the UK leaves, it will henceforth have to pay more to the EU Budget as its proportionate contribution to help compensate for the loss of Britain’s contribution. On the other hand, a bonus for Ireland of leaving the EU along with the UK is that it would get its sea-fisheries back – the value of annual fish-catches by foreign boats in Irish waters being a several-times multiple of whatever money Ireland has got from the EU over the years.

As regards trade and investment, the Republic sends 61 per cent by value of its goods exports and 66 per cent of its services exports to countries that are outside the continental EU26, mostly English-speaking. It gets two-thirds of its imports from English-speaking countries. The USA is the most important market for the Republic’s foreign-owned firms and the UK for its Irish-owned ones – the latter being particularly important for employment. These two markets together are comparable in importance to that of the EU26 post-Brexit. Taking other English-speaking markets into account makes the English-speaking world much more important for the Republic than the EU minus Britain. This is also so for foreign investors coming to Ireland. Economically and psychologically, Ireland is closer to Boston than Berlin, and to Britain than Germany.

It is not of course a question of the Republic having to choose between one export market and another if it should decide to leave the EU along with the UK. If common sense prevails in the negotiations, there should be continuing free trade between the UK, Ireland and the EU in the context of Brexit and Irexit occurring simultaneously.

Without Britain as an ally beside her in the EU Council of Ministers, the Republic will be in a much weaker position to defend its low rate of company profits tax, which is the principal incentive that it uses to attract foreign capital investment to the country. Germany and the Brussels Commission are already gunning for this. It would also be in a weaker position to defend its fishery interests, its trade interests, its distinctive Anglo-Saxon-based traditions in the area of law and justice, which the EU aims to harmonise, and its military neutrality.

The main argument for the Republic staying in the EU when the UK leaves is the negative one that it is a member of the Eurozone while the UK is not. When the euro was established in 1999, Dublin’s ultra-europhile politicians were so foolish as to adopt the currency of an area with which Ireland does only one-third of its trade. They thought at the time that the UK would be bound to adopt the euro-currency too, and that Dublin would show how “communautaire” it was by going first! The Republic now desperately needs to get its own currency back so that it can devalue it along with sterling and the dollar, and not be stuck with an implicitly overvalued euro that is now crucifying its exports.

That is why Dublin should aim to leave the Eurozone in a planned, concerted manner, negotiating its departure with Germany, the ECB, the UK and the Bank of England in private behind the scenes as part of its move to leave the EU along with the UK, rather than be forced to abandon the euro anyhow in the next Eurozone financial crisis.

The EU plans closer military cooperation when the UK leaves. From Britain’s point of view, can it be be happy with the thought of the Republic participating in EU security and defence policy and implementing ever-closer integation with an EU/Eurozone that is likely to come under greater German hegemony following Brexit?

Germany, like the other 27 EU States, will seek to prevent Brexit if it can but, if it is unable to thwart it, it will accept it, as will the others. This and other considerations may possibly encourage Germany to support Irexit alongside Brexit if that should become Irish Government policy. Germany could more easily aspire to greater hegemony over the continental EU Member States if Ireland as well as Britain cease to be EU members. This should appeal to influential sections of Germany’s current political elite.

It is only since Theresa May’s speech in January that Ireland’s ultra-europhile political Establishment is beginning to realise that Brexit really does mean Brexit, and the case for it being accompanied by Irexit is starting to be heard in Irish business circles. Irish public opinion is in advance of élite opinion on this. An opinion poll last October showed that almost four in ten Irish people would choose open borders and free trade with the UK over the EU. This was before there was any realisation of the hugely adverse effects on the Republic if it is so foolish as to seek to remain in the EU when Britain and Northern Ireland leave it.

That realisation is now growing in Ireland. Both public and élite opinion is likely to move in the direction of Irexit over the coming two years, and UK policy-makers should do all they can to encourage it.

This article originally appeared on the Conservative Home website.

The power of the pen…..

…..or I suppose we should say word processor today!

Correspondence with local papers is one very effective way in which independence campaigners can keep their cause before the public and pressure on the politicians to deliver their promises. Editors like a controversial letters page and, it is said, that this is often the most-read part of the paper.

One of our opponents, a Mr. C.N. Westerman from South Wales, is most industrious in using this method of publicising his views. If you Google, you can see he writes to papers all over the country. This one appeared in the Derby Telegraph  of February 14th under the heading “EU has the best solution for cleaning up our air”.

In every city on Earth, some citizens are being poisoned by pollutants such as nitrogen dioxide from cars and by particulates from diesel lorries.

Many British voters believe that such problems should be solved by “the market”.

Other voters believe that such problems are the province of the Government by means of any necessary punishments to corporations and personally to directors.

Some citizens reckon that , since the expense of dealing with the population’s bad health falls upon the taxpayers through the NHS, then the businesses which cause the pollution should contribute to the cost of the NHS.

But the citizens of the 27 other EU countries have a quite different view that vehicle pollution never was either a commercial matter or a national problem.

They possess quite opposing beliefs, that pollution is an international problem to be solved by national governments uniting into make grants for research in universities to find the best scientific answers so that citizens of all countries can breathe pure air.

The EU idea of social responsibility is is quite opposite to the Trump/UKIP populist thinking so common today.

EU citizens are living at a higher level of human thought than Brexit voters. Within the EU the role of all governments is to serve the needs of the world and its peoples.

Now this is a very well written letter but the arrogance is more breathtaking than the air pollution Mr. Westerman complains about! In other letters he has referred to those who do not share his views as “moral degenerates”.

So I thought it deserved a response and the Derby Telegraph printed this reply the next day .

The industrious Mr. C.N.Westerman churns out letters in praise of the EU at a great rate. He thinks that the inhabitants of mainland Europe are somehow higher beings than ourselves. He writes “EU citizens are living at a higher level of human thought than Brexit voters”- a sort of Herrenvolk, it seems.

*It is quite true that some Germans sometimes deride us as “Inselaffen” – Island Apes. They have a right to that opinion and I support freedom of speech – theirs as well as mine and Mr. Westerman’s. They have rather made monkeys out of us through the agency of the EU.

He then goes on to say that only the supermen and superwomen of the EU can control vehicle emissions. Well, it seems to have escaped his notice that our government passed a series of Enabling Acts to bypass our Parliament, to give the EU rule over us and we are living with the consequences. It was actually environmental legislation which encouraged the proliferation of diesel cars. Their fuel efficiency reduced the output of that harmless, beneficent gas carbon dioxide which is also a natural fertiliser. That was the fashionable demon pollutant at the time . They overlooked the diesel’s propensity to belch out nitrous oxide and particulates.

In the meantime, Germany is building a new series of very efficient coal-fired power stations. We could do with some too – to make our industry more competitive – but EU rules would not allow it!

We have been commemorating the centenary of the Great War of 1914-18 and should perhaps consider the war aims for which Germany fought. On 9 September 1914, the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, wrote: “Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany’s Eastern frontier and her domination over non-Russian vassal peoples broken…We must create a Central European Economic Association through common customs treaties to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway….

All members will be formally equal but in practice under German leadership and must stabilise Germany’s economic dominance over Central Europe”.

The EU fits this long-held purpose exactly,which is the reason for the EU’s present proxy war in the Ukraine. If Mr. Putin stops the insane eastward expansion of the EU project, the “Drang nach Osten”, he will have done us as big a favour as the Red Army did at Stalingrad.”

So, campaigners, please do not neglect your local papers!

*  They cut the second paragraph with its references to “Inselaffen” and monkeys. No doubt they were worried about being accused of “hate speech”.  The previous editor had lived some years in Germany and told me  that he had occasionally been called an “Inselaffe” (Island Ape). Although I sent a note to this effect, the paragraph was insufficiently PC.