What is the truth of freedom of movement?

Whilst it is often stated that Freedom of Movement is a non-negotiable and a fundamental indivisible principle of the Single Market, the truth is actually far more complex.  The ‘four freedoms’ are not indivisible for countries outside the EU, such as those who are members of the European Economic Area, (EEA).

Furthermore, the EU has made provision in legally binding and proposed agreements unilaterally to control freedom of movement along with the other freedoms of the Single Market.  The UK could do the same if it remained a member of the Single Market (and wider European Economic Area, EEA) by re-joining The European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  The same actually applies to the EU’s proposed draft text to the Withdrawal Agreement.  Thus Mrs May and her government are, at least in this regard, determined to pursue a Brexit strategy (Brexit in name only) which is far worse than what is actually available utilizing existing established agreements.

The EEA Agreement governs the Single Market (and wider EEA)

The operation of the Single Market (and wider EEA) is set by the EEA Agreement, to which all Member States of the EU and EFTA (excluding Switzerland) are signatories. For the EFTA/EEA members, the EEA Agreement is amended by the addition of Annexes and Protocols.  Thus the EFTA countries have bespoke variations on the basic EEA Agreement. EFTA countries also have greater flexibility since powers retained by individual EFTA countries have often been removed from the individual Member States of the EU and transferred to the European Commission or its agencies (acting for the whole EU).  Consequently EU Member States often find they cannot act unilaterally, whilst individual EFTA countries can do so and they make use of this freedom to serve their interests.

Within the EEA Agreement Freedom of Movement is Unilaterally Controllable

The Single Market (and wider EEA), has free movement of goods, persons, services and capital as basic principles. However, the EEA Agreement also includes an opt-out which can be applied unilaterally by EFTA countries (see Chapter 4, Safeguard Provisions, Article 112), but obviously not by Members States of the EU.  It states:

Safeguard Provisions, Article 112

  1. If serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising, a Contracting Party may unilaterally take appropriate measures under the conditions and procedures laid down in Article 113.
  2. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Agreement.
  3. The safeguard measures shall apply with regard to all Contracting Parties.

This opt-out is intended to be “temporary” (until a permanent solution is implemented), but nevertheless can be invoked and maintained in the absence of that permanent solution.  It has already been used by Liechtenstein to control immigration and Iceland to control capital flows in the wake of the financial crisis.

The EU’s Ability to Unilaterally Control Freedom of Movement

So useful and/or essential does the EU regard Articles 112 and 114 of the EEA Agreement that, rather than them being toothless window-dressing, it chose to include them virtually unchanged in its draft Withdrawal Agreement, Article 13 (Protocols NI) which states:

Article 13 Safeguards

  1. If the application of this Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties liable to persist, the Union or the United Kingdom may unilaterally take appropriate measures. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol.
  2. If a safeguard measure taken by the Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, in accordance with paragraph 1 creates an imbalance between the rights and obligations under this Protocol, the Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, may take such proportionate rebalancing measures as are strictly necessary to remedy the imbalance. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol.

The EU is intentionally ensuring, whether the UK is in the EEA or not, that the EU can unilaterally restrict immigration into the remaining Member States from the UK. The EU is also agreeing here that the UK can unilaterally restrict immigration from the remaining Member States into the UK.

Implementing the Safeguard Measures Immediately

In the UK, there are permanent economic, infrastructural and societal factors which would justify implementing the existing Safeguard Measures immediately, as of 29th March 2019, when we supposedly leave the EU whilst de facto remaining within the Single Market.  Subsequently it would be prudent to negotiate the introduction of specific clauses to enshrine a right to permanent or longer term control.

Why the untruths about Free Movement?

The kindest explanation as to why Freedom of Movement is misrepresented is that many politicians are actually being economical with the truth, and are avoiding the fuller picture which contradicts their claims.  They may also fail to understand the subtleties of that fuller picture.   This is somewhat obvious in Mrs May’s Lancaster House speech 17th January 2017 where she appears to have accepted some very disingenuous claims about free movement. Here are her words:

But I want to be clear. What I am proposing cannot mean membership of the single market.

European leaders have said many times that membership means accepting the ‘4 freedoms’ of goods, capital, services and people. And being out of the EU but a member of the single market would mean complying with the EU’s rules and regulations that implement those freedoms, without having a vote on what those rules and regulations are. It would mean accepting a role for the European Court of Justice that would see it still having direct legal authority in our country.

Mrs May also appears to fail to understand how the EU and EEA works, including the subordination of the European Court of Justice. These are explained in more detail here with links to further information.

The great tragedy of missed opportunity

This country desperately needs the powers to choose who we should let in and under what circumstances. This was one of the loudest great messages from the Brexit Referendum result. Voters want us to be able to control our borders. To repeat, that power of control is there in legal texts. It could have been grasped by Mrs May and her colleagues in government if they had chosen to do so.   They have chosen – at least up to now – instead a path of uncertainty, cave-ins to the EU and potential chaos.  It is a price the British people should not have to bear.

A year to go and we’re nowhere near a satisfactory Brexit

A significant milestone which most people would otherwise probably have failed to have noticed has been widely reported in the media today.

The picture above depicts how I had been imagining the mood will be in exactly a year’s time – on March 29th 2019 when the two-year Article 50 period expires and we finally leave the EU. As things stand, however, it will be Brexit in name only, so most certainly not be a cause for celebration. Ahead lies a minimum of 21 months as a vassal state, where we will continue to suffer all the frustrations of being in the EU without any representation in the EU institutions.

Looking back to that incredible morning of 24th June 2016 when the referendum result was announced, not even the worst pessimist could have predicted the complete shambles which the Government has made of the Brexit negotiations. Without any clear idea of what sort of final deal they sought and outsmarted at every turn by Michel Barnier  and his team, Theresa May and David Davis have made concession after concession to the EU and have come up with the idea of a transitional deal as a means of buying time after realising that so many areas of detail cannot be sorted out in time for a long-term deal giving us full independence to be signed off in time to be implemented a year from today.

So we are facing a situation where our bright future has been postponed. No restrictions on immigration, no freedom from the European Court of Justice, no cut in our contribution to the  EU’s coffers and the decimation of our fishing industry. This was not what we voted for in June 2016.

The big question is why so many Tory MPs, even staunch supporters of independence, are being so quiescent in the face of what is likely to be a disaster, not just for the fishing industry, but for the country as a whole  – and thus, for their party electorally. Are they, as one report suggests, mere “paper tigers”  who “may huff and may puff, but they won’t blow the Prime Minister’s house down – however far any heads of agreement deal may be from perfection”?

Thankfully, all is not lost – yet. The divorce document has to be signed off not only by the EU but by our Parliament too and the combination of a vote forced through (ironically) by remainers giving MPs the chance to reject the final deal and Mrs May’s wafer-thin majority may save the day. For one thing, the Irish border issue, in spite of reports to the contrary, is unlikely to be solved quickly in a way that will satisfy the Democratic Unionist Party, upon whose support Mrs May depends.

Secondly, the cave-in on fishing has provoked immense anger – on a scale that appears to have taken the government aback. Michael Gove was clearly uncomfortable when he faced some awkward questions in the House of Commons and given the fishing industry’s long history of campaigning, we can be sure that we have not heard the last of this issue yet.

Furthermore, it is not too late to try a different approach. The EEA/EFTA route has its friends and also its critics among Brexit supporters. Everyone, however, must agree on two points. Firstly, that it is not the ideal long-term relationship for an independent UK to have with the EU, but secondly (and in the immediate context, far more importantly), it is better as an interim arrangement in every way than the transitional terms which the EU is offering us – and is still a viable option which could be implemented with in a year. The EEA/EFTA countries are not part of the political structure of the EU, subject only to the 25per cent or so of laws relating to the internal market, not directly subject to the ECJ but to the EFTA court which can only rule on EEA-relevant matters and does not have any formal powers of enforcement. IF we took this option, we would be outside the Common Security and Defence Policy, the so-called  “Common Area of Freedom and Justice” – especially the EAW, Europol and the Eurogendarmerie. We would also be outside the Common Agricultural Policy  and critically, our fishing industry can return to domestic control. We could also restrict immigration as Liechtenstein has done.

For those who would like some more detail on this subject, this chart was produced by Anthony Scholefield during the Referendum campaign and although showing the advantages of the EEA/EFTA route compared with EU membership, if you substitute “our vassal statehood after 29th March 2019” for “remain” would still be a pretty accurate comparison.

We believe that all is not yet lost, but the lunacy of Mrs May and Mr Davis in pursuing this terrible transitional arrangement is totally baffling given something better is on offer. The electoral consequences for the Conservatives will be enormous. The sooner and more often they hear “1846” whispered in their ears* the more likely we are to see a desperately-needed change of tack.

 

  • In 1846, a crisis over the Repeal of the Corn Laws precipitated  a crisis for Robert Peel and the Tory party. The damaging split which ensued kept the Conservatives effectively out of office for 28 years. Your author is firmly convinced that the party will face a catastrophe of equal magnitude if Brexit is botched.

Brexit means Brexit (in name only)

Politicians, civil servants and Eurocrats, economical with the truth as ever, if not actually disingenuous, are doing their best to create a Brexit in name only.  Mrs May, Mr Davis and the Department for (not) Exiting the European Union (EU) are carrying on regardless. They appear oblivious to the contradictions in what they are saying and doing, and the obvious warning signs from Brussels.  The following merely illustrates the tip of a delusional, ill-informed myopia.

Mrs May in an interview broadcast on 2nd February 2018 on Channel Four said:

“ …..we have until March 2019, that is when we are leaving the European Union. 

… What we are going to be negotiating with the European Union is a free trade agreement with them that will be about a tariff free, a frictionless trading as possible. …..That’s the sort of deal I’m going to be negotiating……What we will have in future and that is what the next few months negotiating is about is a bespoke free trade agreement.”

The EU sees things somewhat differently and has remained consistent in its approach, although as time passes it appears to be getting increasingly uncompromising and demanding.  Its top priorities are the preservation of its own interests and obedience to its rules rather than accommodating the wayward United Kingdom. This is very apparent in recent report and their published text and slides on the EU’s view of the transitional period.

Mr Barnier (the EU’s chief negotiator) on his recent trip to London, repeating previous comments (for example), said:

“The only thing I can say – without the customs union, outside the single market – barriers to trade and goods and services are unavoidable.”

An all-singing, all-dancing free trade agreement is not likely to be the long term solution even if it can be negotiated. Furthermore, negotiations on such a deal can only start after the UK has formally left the EU, that is, after 29th March 2019 or later, as confirmed the EU’s Trade Commissioner back in 2016. The EU’s perspective on a free trade agreement with the UK is roughly on the lines of  ‘OK if it is a win for us and a lose for you’.  The Irish Times has recently been reporting on what the EU is up to, such as hamstringing our businesses and government, and retaining the right through the Common Fisheries Policy to plunder our Exclusive Economic Zone (i.e., the waters up to 200 nautical miles from the shoreline. or the median point where the sea is less than 400 nautical miles wide).  The EU’s demands go far beyond what is strictly necessary for trade.

Unbelievably Mrs May is likely to agree to this and much more. Time is not on her side. Also the unbreakable law of negotiations is against her as well – in other words, ‘money and concessions flow from the weakest (or more desperate) to the strongest party’.  The transition cave-in (aka agreement to avoid a ‘cliff-edge’ of barriers to trade) effectively turns the UK into a powerless EU vassal state as explained here and here (where vassal status becomes permanent without a free trade agreement).  It looks like this could actually be less awful than the terms eventually on offer for an unfree trade agreement from an omnipotent EU to a subservient Mrs May-led UK.  Germany, in the form of Mrs Merkel, is already making disparaging jokes in semi-private about Mrs May.

That a domestically weak Mrs Merkel can lampoon our supposed ‘negotiating dreadnought’ points to an uncompromising EU/German-centric position.  And what Germany wants from the EU, Germany gets.  After all, the EU is a political construct which was designed to tame German nationalism, whilst facilitating its industrial, commercial and demographic clout, and at the same time giving France delusions of grandeur. Economic objectives are subordinate, not dominant to political objectives.  In considering a free trade agreement there should be no underestimating the EU’s continuing priorities of control-freak centralisation (under German hegemony), homogeneity and undermining national identities.  It is unlikely Mrs Merkel (or her eventual successors) will treat the UK kindly as this could encourage other Member States to rebel.

Yet the prospect of the UK becoming a permanent, powerless EU vassal state by indefinitely extending the transitional arrangement or by signing a one-sided free trade agreement is basically thanks to Mrs May’s dithering.  Although presumably Mr Davis and the Department for (not) Exiting the European Union had some input. Mrs May, for reasons never explained, decided that we must leave the Single Market (and by extension the European Economic Area, EEA). Remaining in the EEA by rejoining EFTA, the European Free Trade Association, is a much better proposition as a temporary or transitional measure. It would allow fairly frictionless trade and a breathing space in which to negotiate a suitable long-term trading relationship without being under duress.

The EFTA/EEA option allows for control of immigration through unilaterally invoking Article 112 (the Safeguard Measures) of the EEA Agreement.  The EFTA route to EEA membership gives members outside the EU a say in EU legislation affecting the EEA, is largely free (although ‘voluntarily’ Norway does contribute to regional development funds) and is outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The EEA Acquis or body of law is about a quarter of the total EU Acquis since it only relates to successful functioning of the EEA. And EFTA members make their own trade agreements with other countries.  Membership of the EEA solves the problem of maintaining a soft border in Ireland between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. It also gives us full control of fishing.

When Mrs May first rejected remaining in the Single Market, in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017 she appears to have been unaware of the EFTA/EEA route and its possibilities. Unfortunately, she does appear both then and in her later Florence speech of 22nd September 2017, to have swallowed ‘hook, line and sinker’ the disingenuous line repeatedly peddled by the EU leaders about the four freedoms (of movement of goods, capital, services and people) being inviolable – they certainly are if you are a Member State of the EU but not for EFTA countries who can unilaterally invoke Article 112 of the EEA Agreement.

EU leaders and Mr Barnier in particular appear to have been both unhelpful and economical with the truth about the EFTA/EEA route. However, recently it appears the European Commission may be seriously evaluating the EFTA/EEA route for transitional arrangements for the UK as noted by an EFTA Court judge (Mr Carl Baudenbacher) giving evidence to the Commons Committee for Exiting the EU on 7th February 2018 and reported in the Telegraph on-line. It would be very ironic if it was the EU which finally pushed Mrs May into signing up even temporarily to a better proposition – i.e., EFTA/EEA membership –  than the one she is currently minded to pursue.

We can but hope that common sense will prevail for if not, no amount of spin will be able to conceal the truth about Mrs May’s submissive transition to an unfree trade agreement. There will obviously be a heavy political price to be paid in the next General Election in 2022 for short- changing the British people over Brexit through turning this country into a permanent EU Vassal State.

Macron and Marr muddy the waters as Brexiteers speak out against the ECJ

The headlines in Open Europe’s daily e-mail sounded very promising:-  “UK could have a bespoke arrangement between full single market access and a free trade deal, says Emmanuel Macron.” Isn’t that what everyone has wanted? Could it even be “having cake and eating it”?

Not if one reads the small print. Macron’s comments were made during an interview for the Andrew Marr Show. Nicola Shawson of the Guardian listened to the full interview and pointed out that Macron insisted that there would be no cherry-picking:-

Pressed on whether there would be a bespoke special solution for the UK, Macron said: “Sure, but … this special way should be consistent with the preservation of the single market and our collective interests… and you should understand that you cannot, by definition, have the full access to the single market if you don’t tick the box.”

So nothing new here. We will get a deal giving us some degree of access to the single market, but not full access. It will be worse than the access we enjoy as a full member. Fine. We already knew that.

Another person who listened to Macron’s interview with Andreew Marr was Richard North, who pointed out that Macron contradicted himself:-

By definition, he said, the relationship will be “less deep than today”. The deepest possible relationship is being a member of the European Union. But he then adds: “As you decided to leave you cannot be part of the single market”.

Now this is confusing because he goes on to say that “you can have some deeper relations and some others”. For instance, he says, “we have a deeper relation with Norway than the – the one we have with Canada”. So it depends on the outcome of the Brexit negotiation but, unless you change your mind, you will not be part of the single market because you will not be part of the European Union.

Addressed to someone like Andrew Marr, who already has a slender grasp of the basics – to say nothing of the body politic in general – this sort of confusion, where he elides membership of the EU and the Single Market, can be fatal.

Certainly, the French President seems to contradict what he was saying last week in the aftermath of the Anglo-French summit at Sandhurst.

It’s therefore not only our side which is getting into a muddle over Brexit.

Macron and Marr were discussing a longer-term EU-UK relationship, Turning to the transitional arrangements, it is encouraging to note that opposition is mounting among Conservative MPs to any role for the ECJ and to free movement of people after 29th March 2019 – Brexit day.  Jacob Rees-Mogg didn’t mince his words about free movement nor the cost of the Brexit settlement, while ex-ministers Iain Duncan-Smith, John Redwood, Owen Paterson and Lord Lawson also made clear their opposition to any involvement of the ECJ once we are formally out of the EU.

Of course, it is one thing to point out the bad features of a proposed deal and quite another to come up with a suitable alternative, particularly one which will satisfy the business community, which is desperate for some guidelines in time to plan for life outside the EU. Some compromises will have to be made as it is impossible to find even a short-term deal which will tick everyone’s boxes. A total surrender to the EU, however, turning us into a colony of Brussels for 21 months, is definitely not the answer and it is good that voices in Parliament are beginning to be raised which will hopefully force a re-think – and soon.

 

PS: Since this article was published, a further article which provides an indication of the scale of opposition to free movement of people and any role for the ECJ after Brexit has appeared in the Independent. Mrs May is going ot have a very tough time trying to get an agreement for the transitional deal as it stands, although a leadership challenge, as suggested by the author of the article, does look very unlikely.

Photo by LeWeb14

Awaiting the storm (or explosion!)

It cannot be much longer before the penny finally drops regarding the terms being proposed by the EU for the UK’s 21-month “transitional arrangement.”

Businessmen like John Mills and John Longworth, both of whom met Michel Barnier in Brussels last week, are distinctly unimpressed with what we are likely to be offered, but it is surprising that there haven’t already been even louder cries of outrage from the Conservative back benches. Last November, at a meeting organised by Conservative MEP David Campbell Bannerman, Rt Hon David Jones MP was quite unequivocal that any further involvement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the legal affairs of the UK after Brexit would be an “absolute red line” for himself and a number of his colleagues, who would rather leave with no deal.

As more details emerge, it is becoming clear that it’s not just a role for the ECJ in our affairs which the EU wishes to incorporate into the transitional deal. According to an article in The Times, the EU will insist on the free movement of people throughout the period and the inclusion of people moving to the UK before 31st December 2020 in any post-Brexit agreement on citizens’ rights.. This again is a slap in the face for leave voters. It’s not just that many of us voted leave because we want to see a drastic cut in immigration; more to the point, we voted leave because we wanted our institutions to be sovereign – and this means that the EU must have no say in determining who can or cannot come into the UK or how long they can stay.

This tougher stance is contained in a new document dated 15th January. It is not the final word on the EU’s position, which will not be published until the end of the month, but it certainly gives us an idea of the general direction of travel. The guidelines produced last year by the European Parliament, although essentially a consultative document, were bad enough. We would be, in effect, a colony of the EU, unable to sign any trade agreements with other countries and still subject to the Common Fisheries and Common Agricultural policies. This document was bad enough, but according to Bloomberg, the latest document also states that we would need to seek the EU’s permission even to start negotiations on trade deals with third parties. We would be unable to strike out on our own path. The net “divorce bill” may also be increased.

Perhaps ironically, the Council President Donald Tusk told the European Parliament that “our hearts are still open “that the UK might “have a change of heart” and stay within the EU. This suggests a warmth towards us which just is not reflected in the negotiating guidelines which seem designed to squeeze and humiliate us as much as possible. Chancellor Philip Hammond claimed recently that the EU is “paranoid” that other countries will follow us out of the door. It has also been claimed that the EU is pressurising Switzerland not to make a bilateral deal with the UK The EU’s tough stance may well all be technically justifiable from the treaties, but it clearly wishes to interpret them in the toughest way possible as far as Brexit is concerned. No one with any sense of self-respect should give in to this bullying.

The transitional deal must therefore be kicked into the long grass as soon as possible, especially as there is no guarantee that a new trade deal will be ready to replace it after 21 months. The EU’s ambassadors have signalled a willingness for the transitional period to be extended, but this would only prolong an unsatisfactory situation which is not Brexit in any real sense of the term.

A further complication is looming on the horizon. The Norwegians have indicated that they would seek to renegotiate their trading arrangements with the EU if we were given favourable access to the EU’s single market  while not being a member of it.  This, of course, refers to any long-term deal and therefore is not an issue for Mrs May at the moment as the EU has insisted that negotiations on a long-term trading arrangement cannot start yet.  Let’s face it, she has enough on her plate as her team prepares to negotiate the transitional arrangements. We must hope that there is already a storm brewing up on the Conservative back benches which will rapidly knock these unacceptable proposals on the head and force the government to take a different approach.

If not, the storm is likely to strike with far greater ferocity  in four years’ time. A botched Brexit where we leave in name only is not what we voted for and not what Mrs May promised us when she became leader.   Brexit must mean Brexit or our Prime Minister will not only find herself consigned to a “rogues gallery”, excoriated by posterity alongside the likes of Lord North, Neville Chamberlain, Heath, Blair and Brown, but she may well take her party down with her.

Impressions of meeting with Michel Barnier in Brussels – John Mills

ON WEDNESDAY, 10TH JANUARY 2018

    Michel Barnier is an impressive person, tough and charming, who is evidently well on top of his Brexit brief and thus a formidable person to have on the other side of the table as the Brexit negotiations take place. He wants to get a deal completed but not at any cost to the EU27.

    His primary aim is to secure the integrity and security of the Single Market and the Customs Union rather than to search for a deal which is necessarily in the overall best interest of both the UK and the EU27. The notion that the EU27 may make substantial concessions to avoid economic pain is therefore very probably misplaced.

    While the best outcome from both the UK’s and the EU27’s point of view has always seemed to be for the UK to be outside the Single Market and the Customs Union but with a free trade deal in place covering goods and as many services as possible, this now looks as though it may be difficult to achieve. This is despite the fact that this is substantially the relationship the EU27 has with other countries as varied as Israel, Peru, Mexico, South Korea, Canada and the Ukraine.

    There are at least four major reasons why this is the case, these being:

1. The UK is starting from a radically different position from these other countries – essentially looking for a divorce rather than marriage, with all the baggage that this brings with it.

2. The UK is a much larger player in EU trade terms than any of these other countries, and thus potentially more disruptive if derogations are needed from the existing carefully balanced EU acquis.

3. The UK’s negotiation position has been gravely weakened both by the sequencing insisted on by the EU27 – dealing with money, Ireland and citizenship before trade – and by the result of the recent general election which has left no majority in Parliament for the WTO option which – although not the optimal outcome – is the only realistic fall-back position for the UK to have, without which the EU27 is left with all the cards in its hands.

4. Time is running short, although some extension of time by suspending Article 50 to create the proposed transitional period may help.

    In these circumstances, the most likely offer to the UK from the EU27 seems be free movement of goods and some concessions on services with the UK formally outside the Single Market and probably the Customs Union too but with the UK having to continue to accept nearly all the legal and regulatory obligations currently in place. These will almost certainly include substantial annual net contributions to the EU budget, free movement of people, significant jurisdiction by the ECJ, constraints on the UK’s capacity to negotiate trade deals on its own, and continuing membership of both the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy.

    An offer to the UK along these lines would probably be supported by all the EU27, led by Germany and France, but may not be acceptable to Parliament, let alone the British electorate. In these circumstances, preparing for the UK to fall back on WTO terms appears to be essential both to safeguard the position if no acceptable deal is presented to the UK, and to stiffen the UK’s negotiating position in the meantime.

    There may well be calls in circumstances where no acceptable deal is offered to the UK, for a second referendum on the UK’s EU membership, although probably only by a small minority of diehard Remainers. Even in the unlikely event of another referendum being held, current polls indicate that it would be unlikely to produce a different outcome from the one held in June 2016, thus confirming that Brexit is some form is likely to be inevitable.

    If the EU27 wants a deal with the UK it is therefore essential that this takes account of the political realities exposed by the 2016 EU referendum and current polls, which is that – if push comes to shove – the UK electorate would very probably be willing to opt for a clean break with the EU rather than finishing up being in a worse position than we were before Brexit started – with all the obligations against which people voted still in place, but with the UK having no say in how the EU develops in future.

John Mills 11th January 2018