Small teacup, big storm?

The agreement hammered out at Chequers last Friday went down like a lead balloon among Tory Brexit supporters. Here is the text of the final statement.  Martin Howe QC, from Lawyers for Britain, produced a briefing which expressed grave concern that it would leave us tied in perpetuity to EU law and forced to accept binding rulings by the European Court of Justice.

The EU laws in question were those relating to goods, their composition, their packaging, how they are tested, etc etc, in order to enable goods to cross the UK/EU border without controls. This does, of course, raise the question as to how aware critics like Mr Howe actually are that many rules governing standards within the Single Market are not actually set by Brussels. The EU merely acts as a conduit for laws originating with global standards bodies to which we would have to be subject regardless of the Brexit model adopted.

Note the word “goods” rather than “trade”. Mrs May’s proposals would have seen the UK essentially remain in the single market for goods but not for services.  This was never going to wash with the EU. as some commentators were warning within hours of the statement being released.

Its pie-in-the-sky nature did not stop a deluge of negative comment. A majority of Conservative Party members regarded it as a bad deal, so said Paul Goodman after conducting a snap poll for Conservative Home.  More ominously, a poll commissioned by Change Britain suggested that a deal along the lines of that proposed by Mrs May would cost the Tories a lot of votes. For example, 32% of voters would be less likely to vote Conservative if the Government agreed a deal which results in UK laws being subject to rulings by EU courts and More than a quarter would be less likely to support the Conservative Party if a deal meant that the EU retained some or substantial control of the UK’s ability to negotiate our own free trade agreements.

Still, if the EU’s spokesmen had acted quickly to reject the deal out of hand, it would have been a storm in a teacup for the Tories, which would have blown over. Simon Coveney, the Irish Republic’s Foreign Minister, said that Michel Barnier would find it “difficult ” to accept the  proposals. It is now quite probable that he won’t have to do so as a crisis has erupted at the very heart of Mrs May’s government. On Sunday night, David Davis resigned. Effectively sidelined by Olly Robbins for many months, the most surprising aspect of Mr Davis’ announcement is that it has taken so long in coming. With him went his deputy Steve Baker. Mrs May reacted speedily and appointed Dominic Raab, a prominent Brexit supporter, to replace Mr Davis. However, within hours of Mr Davis going, Boris Johnson resigned as Foreign Secretary.

This means that a small teacup is producing what could turn out to be a considerable storm. Mrs May is due to meet her backbenchers later this evening and especially given her decision to brief Labour and Lib Dem MPs on her Brexit proposals, the mood is likely to be sombre if not angry.

One Labour source said of this meeting, “It’s an opportunity to tell the PM’s chief of staff why the Government has got it so wrong.”  With that, we would agree.  Almost every government publication on the subject of Brexit is, at best muddled.  The fisheries white paper also appeared last week – its publication somewhat overshadowed by the dramatic events following the Chequers meeting.  We will provide some further comment oin this later this week, but suffice it to say it seems very optimistic, ignoring the determination of the EU to preserve its access to our waters and to control the allocation of quota if it gets half a chance.

With events happening so quickly, it is impossible to predict whether Mrs May will face a leadership challenge or indeed whether the Brexit talks will break down. However, we have been saying for some time that a crisis is essential if the disastrous Brexit plans hatched by Mrs May, including the fatally flawed transitional arrangements, are to be jettisoned. At long last, it looks like the crisis has arrived.

 

Confusion over our legal status in the transition period

During the House of Lords select committee on 1st. May 2018, the Earl of Kinnoull said to David Davis Brexit Secretary of State,  “I want to come back to what you said about the European Union not being able to agree a treaty with us while we are still members. I have been troubled and scratching my head over that”.

He is not the only one. Article 50, the mechanism which secures the UK departure from the EU as from  30th March 2019, raises two serious problems.

1) The EU treaties, and thus all its regulations will cease to apply to the UK as from 30th  March 2019.

2) The EU can’t sign a Treaty with the UK while the UK is still a Member, meaning the earliest being 30th March 2019.

Put together, these two conditions cause serious problems, because if you compare the procedure in joining the then EEC in 1972, there was an orderly procedure. First came the signing  the  treaty of membership on 22nd January 1972, and then followed the ratification process, resulting in the European Communities 1972 Act, which ensured everything was ready to commence membership on 1st January 1973.

The leaving process, by contrast, is topsy-turvy. The procedure has been reversed. Taking evidence from David Davis during the Lords’ session and the House of Commons select committee of 25th April, you can understand why the Earl of Kinnoull is scratching his head. Mr Davis appears to be contradicting himself.

Before the House of Commons, he stated that there will be several votes on the outcome of the negotiations with the first vote being what has been referred to as the “meaningful” vote: a vote on the overall treaty and agreement in both Houses.  We will do this before the European Parliament will vote on it. Here are some of the questions:-

Q1388 Chair: Will the document on the future relationship be a political declaration or a draft treaty?

Mr Davis: It will be at that stage a statement of the Council. I would not imagine we will have legal text at that point.

Q1389 Chair: What status will it have if it just a statement of the Council?

Mr Davis: Nearer to political declaration than draft treaty. It will not be in draft as a legal text at that stage.

Q1390 Chair: It is likely to be a political declaration, and a political declaration is not a treaty.

Mr Davis: No, it is not a treaty. Again, to remind you of previous evidence, Mr Chairman, when I have appeared in front of this Committee I have reminded you that the requirements of European law are that they cannot sign a treaty with us until we are a third country. That means they cannot sign a treaty, which is the only point at which a treaty becomes in any way binding, until the first days of April or the last day of March in 2019.

Q1391 Chair How can Parliament set any store by it if it is asked to vote on this whole process when the really important question of our future relationship is merely a statement of the Council in the form of a political declaration and not a draft treaty?

Mr Davis: That does not mean the Council will not view it as binding. After all, each of the agreements we have come to in December and March are seen as binding. They are not legally binding but we view them as completely politically binding. (By International Law, not EU Law)

In summary, Mr Davis told the House of Commons that there may be more than one treaty, for a start. It is impossible. We do not know what the full structure of the treaty will look like: whether security and defence will be separate from the future economic partnership. It is quite possible. Some of these things will have substantive domestic effects, so they will of course come with Acts of Parliament before the House as well.

However, he told the House of Lords that we have to have everything pretty well nailed down even legally at the beginning of the implementation period. It will not be ratified, because they cannot sign a deal with us until we are a third country, which will be shortly after formal departure from the Union, but the ratification process will also take place during that period. To achieve this, the agreement must be basically complete by October, at least in joint report-type terms, and fully legally watertight by the time we leave.

He added that signatures will not be put to the treaty until after Brexit Day because “they can only sign with a third party, as Lord Jay knows better than most, I guess. So I will aim to conclude the negotiation, if I can get to that point by then, so that they can sign and then start the ratification process. Remember that ratification will require a brand new European Parliament, which will only just be being elected at that point, and a brand new Commission, and almost certainly—for some of it at least, if not for all of it—it will be a mixed agreement, so it will go round the Parliaments of Europe. So there is quite a lot to get done in ratification terms. We absolutely have to have ratification concluded before the implementation period is over, otherwise we will be in a sort of limbo.”

We need to remember that ratification is the  action of signing or giving formal consent to a treaty, contract, or agreement, making it officially valid. That is , valid according to EU Law. An example of this took place with Denmark over Maastricht and Ireland over Lisbon, where EU law did not apply until after ratification yet International Law did – and of course, under the proposed implementation period, we would expect to be under the ECJ, so what would be the legal basis?

In summary, like Lord Kinnoull, we are all scratching our heads, because it is utter confusion. It needs some bright lawyer to pin Davis down to what is going on. I have only taken this line of investigation  because I questioned the legal right for the UK to have exclusive use of the 12 nautical mile fishing limit during the implementation period, fearing that we could run the risk of EU vessel owners, not only fishing inside that limit, but taking the UK to court, as happened in the Kent Kirk case in 1983.

A deep and special fantasy world

Following the return of MPs to Parliament after the Easter Recess, their responses to recent Brexit developments will be closely watched. The lack of anger from Tory MPs thus far has been disappointing. The surrender on fishing in the draft transitional agreement has greatly upset the fishing community. It poses the question as to whether it would be right to sacrifice one of our historic industries even if we did end up with an all-singing, all-dancing deal at the end of 21 months. To destroy our fishing industry for a pure illusion is even worse, but this is what our government seems to be doing.

The “deep and special” relationship between the EU and the UK exists only in the minds of a few UK politicians; it is certainly not how the EU views its future links with a departing member state whose decision to leave the bloc was one of the biggest body blows it has ever faced.

Last week, David Davis announced plans to send “hundreds” of civil servants to Brussels to work on the deal. Within days, a senior EU source announced that this wasn’t going to happen. “There will be no negotiation strands, no ‘hundreds’ of British negotiators,” said an un-named diplomat.  “Trade negotiations will not start properly until after 29 March 2019. Before that we must get the fundamentals right,” the source said.

One important, unresolved issue is the status of Gibraltar, with Michel Barnier indicating that Spain will enjoy strong support from the other EU member states. Spain’s demands include the joint control of Gibraltar’s airport, cross-border cooperation on smuggling and ending what it sees as a tax haven with far lower corporation rates.

Yesterday’s Parliamentary written questions laid bare the depths of unreality which still pervade our government. Steve Baker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, was anything but clear when questioned by the Labour MP Paul Blomfield. When discussing the transitional priod, he said “The agreement will be underpinned by a duty of good faith and governed by a Joint Committee to ensure it is faithfully and fully implemented by both sides.” As John Ashworth of Fishing for Leave asked, “Since when have the EU run on good faith?” Mr Baker also went on to say, “As we move towards our future partnership with the EU, we will need to discuss how we manage the relationship once we are two separate legal systems.” The legal divergence begins on 29th March 2019, when “the  treaties will cease to apply” to the UK.  There still seems very little idea, from the UK point of view,  how the UK will relate to the EU in the transitional period from a legal point of view. We may keep our laws in step with Brussels but they will have a different legal basis.

Discussions on Brexit in the House of Lords revealed the same sense of muddle. Questioned by Lord Taylor of Warwick, Lord Callinan said, “During the implementation period the UK will be in a continued close association with the EU Customs Union. This will ensure a smooth exit and minimise disruption for businesses. HMRC are confident that they are on track to deliver the functioning customs, VAT and excise regimes the UK will need once it leaves the EU.” It is hard to share HMRC’s confidence, especially as far as the Irish Border issue is concerned.

It is becoming apparent to anyone following these negotiations that the performance of Mrs May and David Davis has been completely pathetic. The EU has walked all over them.  We can but hope that opposition from Brexit-supporting MPs within their party is merely dormant and that they will make it loud and clear that they will not support the proposed arrangements, including the terms for a transitional deal, nor the surrender on fishing nor, indeed, the proposed close military cooperation.  Sooner or later, it will dawn on them that their party will pay heavily for a botched Brexit. it is in everyone’s interest for that moment to arrive as quickly as possible so that there is time to change tack.

 

Photo by Internet Archive Book Images

The fantasy of a “frictionless” trade agreement

Mrs May and Mr Davis’ oft repeated aspiration for ‘frictionless’ trade with the European Union (EU) via a free trade agreement (FTA) and mutual recognition of standards will in reality consign the United Kingdom to being a permanent EU vassal stateBrexit will be in name only, with “stay, pay, obey without a say” being the outcome of their mishandling the Brexit negotiations.  The transition agreement, which turns the UK into an EU vassal state thanks to completely caving in to unreasonable demands by the EU, is a forerunner of even worse things to come. The transition deal (partially agreed, although a long way from being ratified) is vastly inferior to the deal which they could have obtained, but rejected out of hand as far back as Mrs May’s Lancaster House speech 17th January 2017. We could have retained our membership of the Single Market (and wider European Economic Area, EEA) through re-joining, even temporarily, The European Free Trade Association, EFTA. This alternative, also known as the ‘Norway Option’, could have delivered practically ‘frictionless’ trade and a soft border on the isle of Ireland.

At the heart of Mrs May and Mr Davis’ highly risky, far-fetched and delusional approach to Brexit is a failure to understand the nature of the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), EFTA’s working relationship with the EEA including the EEA Agreement, mutual recognition of standards and how world trade works.  They make the most basic mistakes and repeat factually incorrect or incomplete statements to support their contradictory desire to leave the Single Market while retaining the same level of market access through an FTA.  They appear unwilling to take cognisance of readily available facts that completely disprove their fatuous mantras.

The details of what will happen after the UK leaves the EU (and the EEA) are there for anyone to see on the EU’s dedicated website  – especially in the increasing number of “Notices to Stakeholder”s under Brexit preparedness) It makes somewhat chilling reading.  There is nothing equivalent on the Department for (not) Exiting the European Union’s website. Presumably either they haven’t done this vital work or have chosen not to share it – a truth too awful to tell?

Upon leaving the EU and the EEA we would become a ‘third’ country. We would then be subject to different requirements by the EU in order,  at best, to manage the risks (to consumers and others) of doing business with us (or any other ‘third country’ outside the Single Market or EEA) and, at worst, to erect protectionist trade barriers in favour of domestic EU enterprises.  From the EU’s perspective, they will not grant concessions to ‘third’ country suppliers outside their control which are not enjoyed by EU domestic suppliers, especially when these could increase risks or create an ‘unfair’ competitive advantage.  The EU also has to treat the UK the same as any other ‘third’ country in order to comply with World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreed requirements or principles.

The EU is developing the Single Market by harmonising standards, regulations, and enforcement or surveillance within a top down centralised legalistic and bureaucratic framework under their supervision and control. It is also a long-established declared ambition that ‘third’ countries (outside the EU, or wider European Economic Area, EEA) would adopt or follow at least some EU-style measures.  The EU’s approach (to products) is outlined in principle in COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Enhancing the Implementation of the New Approach Directives and in more detail in the EU’s Guide to the implementation of directives based on the New Approach and the Global Approach .

For the EU, mutual recognition of standards (which differ from theirs) has limited application, since it is not their preferred choice where harmonised standards (in their widest context) exist.  In any case, there is the practical complexity and increased cost of demonstrating equivalence and compatibility, which can be far from straightforward and unacceptable to consumers and users.  To take a simple illustration, traffic lights using green on top for ‘stop’ and red underneath for ‘go’ certainly provides equivalent functionality but are far from compatible and acceptable.  Also test values from subtly different tests may mean a product is (theoretically) less safe rendering it unacceptable or requiring expensive (or impractical) re-design, which in turn may invalidate other test results and/or existing certification/approvals.  (See also the Fallacy of Easy Mutual Recognition of Standards).

The EFTA/EEA option is not perfect, but is far more favourable to the UK’s interests than the transitional deal on offer or indeed, to what will eventually emerge as Mrs May’s FTA and ‘deep and special relationship’. Norway participates in the EEA through membership of EFTA. Actually it only implements EU legislation necessary for functioning of the EEA, which at most constitutes around 25% of the total EU acquis or system of laws. More than 90% of these EEA related laws reportedly originate in global bodies, meaning the UK would need to implement them anyway for global trade, unless we leave the World Trade Organisation (WTO), et al. Also the EFTA route to EEA membership gives members outside the EU a say in EU legislation affecting the EEA, is largely free (although ‘voluntarily’ Norway does contribute to regional development funds) and is outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What is more, EFTA members make their own trade agreements with other countries.

Contrary to statements by M. Barnier and Mrs May about the four indivisible freedoms, EFTA/EEA membership contains the facility to control immigration. Two members of EFTA have unilaterally invoked Article 112 (the Safeguard Measures) of the EEA Agreement to restrict free movement – Liechtenstein for people and Iceland for capital. The UK could do so too if we retain membership of the EEA by re-joining EFTA.  Ironically, Articles 112 and 113 of the EEA agreement, which Mrs May rejects, are reproduced closely by the EU in their draft Withdrawal Agreement, Article 13 (Protocols NI), allowing the EU unilaterally to restrict freedom of movement (including immigration into the EU from the UK).

Continuing membership of the EEA solves the problem of maintaining a soft border in Ireland between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, thus avoiding a hard border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK (something Mrs May has ruled out, for the moment).  It also gives us full control of fishing in our Exclusive Economic Zone.  The EEA agreement (for EFTA members) can be adapted to suit their interests.  Thus the UK (within EFTA) could get a bespoke version.  So we could ‘imitate, adapt and improve’ on the existing EEA agreement to suit our needs rather than follow an insular and amateurish effort to ‘re-invent the FTA wheel in a few months’ that isn’t going anywhere.

From the beginning, the EU negotiators completely dominated the Brexit negotiations. It was inevitable then that negotiating concessions (or cave-ins) would be made by weak, dithering and clueless Mrs May and Mr Davis to strong, decisive and professional M. Barnier and his team. Comparing the EU’s draft Withdrawal Agreement with the text agreed by the UK shows just how much the increasingly uncompromising EU is getting its way.  Worse still, the EU is getting away with demands that are over and above those necessary for trade, with more already in the pipeline (such as fishing, defence, defence procurement, locking UK into EU budgets etc.).  If you thought the Transitional Deal was bad, wait until you see the final withdrawal agreement and the FTA.

Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed

Before readers start getting too angry about the agreement between David Davis and Michel Barnier over the terms for an interim relationship with the EU, it must be pointed out that the handshake between the two men does not mean that everything is done and dusted.

The transitional arrangements are only part of an overall deal which have to be approved by the European institutions and national parliaments, including our own. We are still a long way from reaching this point.

On this website, we have already explained why the transitional terms on offer from the EU are unacceptable. It will be very hard to follow it with a truly clean break. We most certainly don’t need to be shackled to the EU’s customs union and any ongoing participation in the Common Fisheries policy would be the ruination of our fishing industry. Fishing for Leave didn’t mince its words in a recent press release – it is nothing less than a capitulation by a weak government.

Just to remind readers about our fisheries:- The UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles/median line was established by a British Act of Parliament – the Fishery Limits 1976 Act – but because of our membersip  of what was then the EEC, that zone was promptly handed over to the EEC, to become EEC/EU waters, right up to the low water mark, and the resource within that zone also became EEC/EU resource, managed by them and not us.

In 1983 the EU established the quota system, shared out amongst the member states by means of what is known as “relative stability keys”. These keys do change when a new member joins or one leaves.

At 11pm, 29th March 2019 the UK’s EEZ is returned to our Westminster Parliament, who must take full responsibility under the guidelines of International Law – UNCLOS3. At that moment all EU quota ceases to exist in the UK’s EEZ.

It is then down to the UK Government with the support from a majority of the Westminster parliamentarians how much of the British peoples resource they intend to give away. There is no negotiation as such.

The EU has no legal authority to demand anything, because in just over a year’s time, the UK will become an independent coastal state under third country status. Unfortunately, it seems that our government is willing to concede to demands which the EU has no right to make.

There is hope that the deal may yet be torpedoed. The Committee for Exiting the European Union could not come to an agreement on a report not about the transitional deal per se but extending it. Jacon Rees-Mogg, in his characteristically eloquent manner,  called the majority report (which he and six colleagues refused to sign) a  “prospectus for the vassal state”.  He also called the its authors the “High priests of Remain”. Mr Rees-Mogg also fired a shot across the bows of Theresa May in an article for the Daily Telegraph. “The United Kingdom will not accept being a subservient state” he said. “In the case of tariffs, once we have left the EU, it is non-negotiable that our trade minister should be able to respond to any threat of increased tariffs from other nations as suits our national interest, not the EU’s,” He went on to add “In the words of one country’s frustrated trade negotiator, Britain has to decide if it is a serious country or a joke nation. It would be humiliating for others to have cause to think thus of us.”

Trade issues are not the only cause for concern. Since the Brexit vote, our government has signed a number of agreements with the EU on military cooperation, without consulting Parliament. The details can be found on the Veteran for Britain website, which we would thoroughly recommend to anyone wishing to follow this subject in greater detail. This article in particular warns of the potential dangers that will result from this and it seems that  ministers have indicated they intend to make the UK’s role in the agreements permanent via the exit treaty. The Government’s published negotiation aims include a proposal to stay in the European Defence Fund and defence industrial programme. This essentially means that we, as a free country, will be ceding our defence to an organisation we voted to leave.

On another key issue, the European Arrest Warrant, one concerned correspondent wrote to his MP about its dangers, which are well- reported on this website, only to be told that we were intending to stay a signatory of  the EAW and that was that.

To end where we began: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. The battle is not lost yet, but our government, whether through incompetence, deceit, spinelessness or all three, is not delivering the Brexit for which we voted. As a democracy, we are given the chance to tell our politicians what we think of them. We in CIB will ensure that they will get the message well before the next General election – indeed, well before any deal is ready for signing. Recent developments are discouraging, but for the good of the country we love, the fight must and will go on. Sadly it appears that our real enemies are not in Brussels (let alone Moscow) but in Westminster and Whitehall.

The Fallacy of Easy Mutual Recognition of Standards

Mrs May and Mr Davis are opening a Pandora’s Box of complexity, confusion and chaos by advocating the Mutual Recognition of Standards to achieve ‘frictionless’ trade post Brexit.  They appear not even to know the basics, being unwilling or unable to clarify what they mean by ‘standards’, and consequently fail to acknowledge the many subtleties and ‘show-stopping’ problems involved.

Mrs May, in her Our Future Partnership speech at the Mansion House on 2nd March 2018, went no further than to express banal generalities about ‘standards’:

“The UK will need to make a strong commitment that its regulatory standards will remain as high as the EU’s. That commitment, in practice, will mean that UK and EU regulatory standards will remain substantially similar in the future.

Many of these regulatory standards are themselves underpinned by international standards set by non-EU bodies of which we will remain a member – such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe, which sets vehicle safety standards.”

Mr Davis, in his Foundations of the Future Economic Partnership Speech in Vienna 20th February 2018, was similarly vague about mutual recognition and standards:

“Such mutual recognition will naturally require close, even-handed cooperation between these authorities and a common set of principles to guide them.

And the certainty that Britain’s plan — its blueprint for life outside of the European Union — is a race to the top in global standards.

And not a regression from the high standards we have now.”

When they talk about standards, what do they mean? Parameters (for safety, performance, environmental impact etc.) and levels of performance against them? Highly prescriptive laws and regulations covering whatever bureaucrats can think of? Standards published by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) or the European Centre for Standardisation (CEN) or the British Standards Institute (BSI)? Organisations that have statutory duties (under UK and/or EU law) to assess conformity or enforce compliance? All of these? –  or something completely different?

Whilst clarity and precision are prerequisites for any published standard or specification, Mrs May appears to believe she has already been clear in setting out what she wants relating to mutual recognition of standards.  In her statement to the Commons 5th March 2018 Mrs May concluded:

“My message to our friends in Europe is clear.  You asked us to set out what we want in more detail. We have done that.”

Unfortunately for Mrs May and Mr Davis, they are not being at all clear what they want and show no indication of even trying to understand the subject of mutual recognition of standards, which they are so convinced they can get the EU to adopt. Furthermore, the arrangements they appear to be seeking conflicts with how the EU uses ‘standards’ and shows their ignorance of how the EU and Single Market functions.  Mutual recognition, where it exists at all, is being superseded by harmonised standards, processes, procedures, regulation and market surveillance, within a centralised legal and bureaucratic framework. Mutual recognition is the laborious, slow exception, not the fast rule.

The European Union (EU) is seeking to move towards the legally mandated use, without deviation, of harmonised requirements and published European Specifications and Standards, for instance  through its New Approach Directives (which cover many products).  These Directives (which are EU law) contain ‘essential requirements’ covering safety, reliability and availability, health, environmental protection, technical compatibility and accessibility. In turn, these may mandate requirements contained in a dated version of a ‘European specification’ which can be a common technical specification, a European technical approval or a national standard transposing a European standard.  A common technical specification is one which has been laid down in accordance with a procedure recognised by the Member States which has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

A Directive will normally only refer to a part (i.e., specific clauses) of a wider ‘European specification’.  European Standards can contain national deviations or special national conditions, but these are then disallowed in the Directive as part of the goal of achieving harmonised requirements.  Derogations (or variations) against requirements in Directives are discouraged requiring the granting of unique or special permission by the relevant authority which increasingly is an arm of the European Commission.  Generally national standards (or rules) can be used only where permitted by a Directive or in the absence of an applicable European specification.

There are published International, European and British standards for materials, components and finished products, processes, systems, management subjects etc. There are also more fundamental ones such as Basic Safety Publications which are intended for use by technical committees in the preparation of standards. Organisations from the UK participate in drafting committees in the ISO, CEN and BSI et al to produce published standards. This involvement will be unaffected by Brexit.

There is also considerable interchange between international standards (ISO, IEC, EN), often with common text or even numbering and cross referencing of requirements.  Also standards first produced by national bodies (such as BSI) can end up being adopted internationally as ISO or European Standards, with some re-drafting.   Generally, International Standards (from ISO, IEC, CEN, CENELEC etc.) are well refined whilst specified requirements in Directives can contain grammatical errors and be mixed with information, thus making them more difficult to follow.

Harmonising standards to produce a single internationally accepted standard and requirements at European or global level makes considerable sense for quality, safety, technical or functional compatibility, production and testing etc. Often, for historical and economic reasons, this is far from being immediately practicable. Perhaps the simplest illustration is paper sizes where the ISO series (which originated in Germany) is not followed in North America leading to endless document reformatting.

Rocking the ‘Standards Boat’, as Mrs May and Mr Davis propose, is a minefield and not for the unwary or ignorant. The above explanation is merely the tip of the iceberg since standards, to be of any use at all, need to be supplemented and implemented within an appropriate legal, regulatory and surveillance framework, which, like it or not, the EU has developed in considerable detail.   They are not going to change.  Consequently to get their Brexit strategy right and ‘deliver a wide range of benefits to enhance competitiveness and performance’ (available from the BSI or ISO), Mrs May and Mr Davis should practise what they preach and race to the top, under independent conformity assessment, by rapidly adopting ISO 44001:2017 (formerly BS 11000) Collaborative Business Relationships