Deal or no Deal?

Britain faces some challenging Brexit negotiations. However viewed through the lens of best practice identified in a commercial negotiating manual, there is evidence that Britain will secure a deal with the EU.

Pre-election rhetoric suggests that the tone of the negotiation might be ‘competitive’ (i.e. hostile). Much of it will actually be about co-operation on matters of common interest like trade, travel, security, etc.

Power is more balanced than some would say. We might buy more from the EU than vice-versa, but proportionately have more to lose on trade. However needlessly damaging a major customer will harm supply chains, EU exporters, EU nationals working in the UK and sending money home…

Over 50% of UK shares are now owned by international investors. EU holdings in the UK are worth £496bn.  At the G20 meeting in September, Japanese business and government demanded Single Market-type access be maintained by both sides.

Policy on both sides is for free trade. This is obviously not absolute –  the EU won’t suddenly complete the single market or open up sensitive defence procurement. But it is committed to various international agreements that commit towards trade liberalisation, stability and not raising barriers.

The EU is a keen supporter of the World Trade Organization (WTO) whose rules allow regional unions (such as the EU) as a means of easing trade between members, but not to raise barriers to trade. In fact, they must avoid creating adverse effects upon other WTO members

There is plenty of incentive for both sides to reach an agreement – if just because they will have to live together as neighbours. The UK could be a major ally in defence and security, so long as its economy is not crashed. It could also be a substantial makeweight in future joint trade deals?

The global economy is so interlinked that failure to reach a viable deal will affect wider economic confidence and stock markets. In the EU, exposed economies like the Irish Republic and Spain would take a hit, with likely local backlash against EU interests – just before the 2019 European Parliament elections.

A botched deal could see the Euro and Sterling hit, with safe haven currencies like the Yen suddenly soaring, hitting wider currency and export stability.

Another factor is the view of the EU’s ‘social partners’.

ETUC represents EU-wide trade unions. Employers’ bodies include Business Europe (‘a CBI’), UEAPME (representing SMEs) and CEEP (representing public service providers). Seen as influential stakeholders, they wish to avoid austerity and damage to Europe’s workers and companies.

Although the EU and UK will start negotiations with some diverging and conflicting positions, remember that this is quite normal for negotiations. Demands tend to be padded so that compromises are seen to be made. Spain has already gone back on the EU ‘demand’ over Gibraltar. In practice, there will be a lot of common ground (e.g. on expat rights). Expect positions to converge.

Despite pre-election rhetoric to appear ‘tough’, it has long been seen that May will play safe and trim to a position that can be pushed through Parliament under tight timescales. This indicates arrangements very similar to being in the Single Market (EEA) as a fallback while the ideal of moving to a bespoke Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) is worked on as arrangements stabilise.

In March, Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, appeared to be leading the UK in the direction of EEA membership as the Brexit option with the least disruption.

Threatening to walk-away was part of that rhetoric. Neither side wants ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ that ‘no deal’ would give. You can bet there will be a deal, even if it’s part agreement, part provisionally keeping respective ships afloat while talks continue.

Negotiations are often about saving face, getting a deal that can be sold to key audiences. The UK might, for example, get better trade terms in exchange for saving the EU a budget shortfall before 2021. Except it won’t be billed as a cave-in, at least in the UK. It might be portrayed as a goodwill gesture to have a joint ‘Brexit adjustment fund’?

Other areas of ‘compromise’ short term might be over accepting EU standards and judgments (which the UK might do anyway in ‘nationalising’ EU laws), or free movement of people. Theresa May has refused to guarantee less EU immigration, consistent with keeping EU citizens’ ‘acquired rights’.

Attitudes to paying the EU vary from ‘they’re getting nothing’ (apart from for joining in specific programmes) to ‘£60bn is nothing to pay for winning back our priceless democracy’. The EU is already preparing for economies after 2021 in its budget, which might reveal the real expectation. However with Germany’s election coming, Angela Merkel and the EU will not want to be seen as saddling Germany with extra contributions. We can expect a harder line short-term.

As an alternative to direct payments, the UK might gesture on recycling saved payments into projects of common interest like defence or tackling irregular migration?

A successful negotiation is one where both sides can claim some success at the end, even if some concessions leave bruises!  Experienced negotiators will recognise that the other party will need to maintain its image too, and they will not seek to humiliate.

Earlier perceptions that the EU might want to ‘punish’ the UK to deter it or others from leaving have been overplayed. Its luminaries might have been exorcising tensions immediately after the referendum shock, and the line taken since has typically been more conciliatory as heads cool. In practice, there is little evidence that any other member state currently wants to follow the UK out of the EU.

European Council President Donald Tusk has quipped that Brexit is ‘punishment enough’ as the UK copes with some upheaval.

There are already outline solutions to some identified problems. The EU can give legal exceptions (derogations) on border measures which might ease the Irish situation. The WTO ‘waiver’ might allow provisional preferential trade agreements to run for a couple of years should there be difficulties (e.g. time-wise) in finalising what is necessarily a complex deal.

The Lisbon Treaty focuses the EU towards the vision of ‘an area of prosperity’ marked by cooperation with neighbouring countries.

Lord (Paddy) Ashdown sees the UK getting a tailored Norway-like deal with a work permit system. He’s not just a Lib Dem peer; he’s President of the European Movement federalists in the UK.

http://www.newalliance.org.uk/ref617.htm has references used for this article.
Print Friendly

1 comment

  1. Phil JonesReply

    To me the main issue in the Brexit negotiations is ‘freedom of movement’. That has to end. But that is the one issue on which the EU will fight tooth and nail to keep in some form. The reason is that freedom of movement is inexorably tied to whether the UK becomes a country (in the international sense of that word) again or remains an EU province — albeit with privileges over the other EU provinces. A country is defined by its right to have sole control over its borders. Canada is a country and Ontario isn’t. The US is a country and Florida isn’t. Australia is a country and New South Wales isn’t. Scotland is a country only in the secondary sense of the word, i.e a territory in which the people have a common culture and history. The UK, France, Germany, etc. were countries until the first Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) of 1992 created EU citizenship and the right of EU citizens to travel freely among the ‘Member States’. The media and Governments went on calling the UK a country after 1992 but it became a country in the secondary sense rather than the primary sense — a Florida rather than a United States.

    In yesterday’s Daily Telegraph the Times newspaper carried the following story, along with a picture of German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel:

    ‘Germany has hinted it would be willing to grant the UK Brexit concessions amid fears that talks could collapse if Theresa May is ousted as Prime Minister as a result of Brussels playing hard ball, according to reports.
    Germany is reportedly willing to be flexible during negotiations which formally get underway today and could offer the UK a so-called soft Brexit deal. Such a deal could involve the UK being offered access to the European single market and granted concessions on curtailing the influence of EU judges IN RETURN FOR BRITAIN ACCEPTING SOME ELEMENT OF FREE MOVEMENT [my capitalization], according to the Times. Sigmar Gabriel, the German foreign minister, told the German Welt am Sonntag newspaper: “Perhaps there is now a chance to achieve a so-called soft Brexit.” ‘

    Angela Merkel herself had said a week earlier that any type of Brexit deal had to include some type of freedom of movement.

    We need to understand that retention of freedom of movement is everything to those creating the new federal European country. As long as Germans, French and others can retain the right, even in a limited form, to enter the UK, the dream of a federal European country that includes the UK will never die. They need a foot in a door, one that can slowly be pried open by a subsequent pro-EU UK Government. Once that door is totally closed, a pro-EU Government of the future couldn’t quietly slowly re-open that door via Cabinet orders.

    The UK will only truly become an independent country again once a person from Germany or France or any other EU province has no better right to enter the UK than does a person from the United States or Brazil or Australia or anywhere else outside the EU.

    So the one issue that I am keeping an eye on with Mr. Davis and Monsieur Barnier is freedom of movement. Mr. Davis and Mrs. May’s Government has in the past called it a RED LINE. We’ll have to see if that remains the case.

Leave a comment