Mayday, Mayday! Brexit Mayday!

Be not intimidated…nor suffer yourselves to be wheedled out of your liberties by any pretense of politeness, delicacy, or decency. These, as they are often used, are but three different names for hypocrisy, chicanery and cowardice. ― John Adams, 1765, British Citizen, Founding Father and 2nd President of The United States of America

It’s over! It’s over, bar the ridiculous charade of ‘tough negotiations’. The thoroughly nasty and vindictive European Union (EU) has won. And gallant, heroic and duped Mrs May and her negotiating team have already lost. We can forget a fair deal on Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and a free trade agreement.  And, unlike in normal divorce proceedings, there is no independent arbitrator to ensure something approaching ‘fair play’ where differences are irreconcilable.

In any negotiation the parties have to progress in good faith because each knows things the other cannot know; privileged information that could be used by the unscrupulous to exploit the situation.  Our contract law consequently places obligations on the parties and means of redress through the courts when one party abuses its position.  Unfortunately the EU, so far, appears to be negotiating in bad faith, not telling the full truth about what can and cannot be negotiated, and the UK is buying the deceptions considerably weakening our position; the EU are effectively ‘laying down the law’ and simultaneously getting us ‘over a barrel’.

Ambassador (rtd) Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos (Former Secretary General of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization) was on the inside of the Article 50 negotiations when it was included it in the Lisbon Treaty. He has revealed that Article 50 was only intended to cover financial arrangements for a Member State leaving the EU. The remaining conditions now being set out by the EU are outside its scope and can only have been included to pressurise us, exact a far heavier price and coerce others into not leaving the EU.  It is one thing freely to negotiate issues that are outside the scope of Article 50 but quite another dishonestly to hold a sword of Damocles over Mrs May’s head that ‘everything must be agreed before anything is agreed’.   Obviously Europhiles on the inside are not going to own up to this subterfuge; they haven’t up to now have they?

Then there is the misinformation about the Single Market, free movement of people, costs of Single Market membership and the jurisdiction of the EU’s European Court of Justice (ECJ) etc. Different arrangements are open to members of EFTA; the European Free Trade Association who are also members of the Single Market, (the European Economic Area (EEA)) but not Member States of the EU and its Customs Union. They can and do negotiate free trade agreements with other countries. Free movement can be unilaterally suspended by any member of EFTA by invoking Article 112 (the Safeguard Provisions) in the EEA Agreement. The UK as a member of EFTA would be able to do the same, if we chose to leave the EU and join this trading association of independent European countries to remain in the EEA.  Also, it costs the EFTA countries little financially to be members of the EEA although Norway does separately contribute towards EU facilities or services used and to development funds.  The ECJ only has jurisdiction over the EU Member States and hence over part of the EEA, but not over EFTA (i.e., non-EU) countries.

There is also increasing evidence that the EU is out to punish us for the temerity of Brexit. Their ‘negotiating position’ is hardening and the language becoming ever more strident.  For example, see Britain needs fighting ‘Plan B’ for trade as EU turns screws on Brexit by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard first published in the Daily Telegraph 26th April 2017. They can also be very obstructionist. For example, see The six Brexit traps that will defeat Theresa May by Yanis Varoufakis, former finance minister of Greece, published in The Guardian 3rd May 2017. Perhaps worse, the EU knows how to inflict real damage on our economy in the event of us leaving the Single Market (EEA) and becoming a ‘third country’ with or without a trade deal.  On the outside, we would face external tariffs, non-tariff barriers (such as special rules, standards, certifications, approvals and inspections) and a massive expansion of Customs Clearances both here and in the protectionist EU (which they might want us to pay for as well).

What we are seeing is a well-established modus operandi for the EU which can be explained in a few quotes from Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission:

When it becomes serious, you have to lie.

We decide on something, leave it lying around and wait and see what happens. If no one kicks up a fuss, because most people don’t understand what has been decided, we continue step by step until there is no turning back.

There can be no democratic choice against the European treaties.

Article 50 negotiations as they now appear can’t achieve a reasonable outcome in our interests (we are being misled) and who would actually choose to touch these EU people  – gangsters more like – with the proverbial barge pole?  We need a plan to out-manoeuvre them, a strategy to ensure they cannot hurt us and to avoid any negotiating except where we are the visibly stronger party; money and concessions invariably flow from the weak to the strong.  These are high stakes and if we get it wrong the EU will likely exact a price worse than they’ve inflicted elsewhere, notably upon Greece.

We could ‘weaponize’ our ingenuity, industry and research to redress the balance of negotiating power, for example, by investigating background facts, intelligence gathering and analysis; something akin to the backroom work of Bletchley Park. There are obvious skeletons in the EU cupboard and some that need digging much deeper, such as the sinister origins of the EU and long-standing anti-British sentiments.  The earliest predecessor of the EU (the European Coal and Steel Community) was profoundly anti-British and had an aim to damage our then industrial power. We were saved by the then Prime Minister Clement Attlee from this calamity, only to have later Prime Ministers and British civil servants collude in the EU’s ‘management of our decline’.  Former EU insiders ‘coming clean’ could be goldmines of information.

We could cultivate allies and build alliances with those we can do business with to mutual benefit.  The obvious ones are EFTA, probably by becoming a (temporary) member. The media here and overseas, up till now mainly Europhile could be another ally. Communications to influence public opinion are essential, otherwise the EU’s propaganda arm and fellow travellers will use it against us.

There are other things that can also be done to defend our national interests once it is recognised that the EU’s actions relating to Article 50 are part of a major scam.

England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example. William Pitt the Younger 1805

Brexit – no U-turns

We are still only in the preliminary stages of the Brexit negotiations. It has taken a long time to get to this point and Mrs May has already faced a tough battle to reach the point where Article 50 could be triggered. Still, so far, she has delivered. She promised that this would happen before March 2017 and in spite of the legal challenges and the opposition of some MPs along with considerably more Lords, she has been as good as her word.

The battles which lie ahead will be harder still. Even if there is a desire for an amicable agreement on both sides, a seamless exit from the EU with our trade virtually unaffected was always going to be a tall order within the two-year timescale of Article 50.

In calling a General Election, Mrs May had made life somewhat easier for herself at home. By March 2019, campaigning would already have begun if the most recent parliament had run its full term and the UK electorate would have been preparing to head to the polls in May 2020. Assuming the polls are correct and she wins a further mandate, she will have a couple of extra years’ breathing space if a transitional deal becomes an essential part of the exit route or else both her government and the EU agree on an extension to the negotiating period.

Failure, however, is not an option. Her party still has a massive uphill struggle to regain the trust of many Eurosceptic voters, some of whose memories go back to Edward Heath’s betrayals in the early 1970s and the bully-boy tactics used by John Major to railroad the Maastricht Treaty through Parliament in 1992. When Mrs Thatcher’s eyes were opened to the true nature of the European project, it was not Labour or Lib Dems but Tory grandees like Michael Heseltine and Geoffrey Howe who stabbed her in the back and engineered her downfall.

Thankfully, the recent Tory intakes of 2010 and 2015 have tipped the balance and while withdrawalists were still a minority among the party’s MPs in last year’s referendum campaign, there are plenty of Conservative anti-EU voices in Parliament whose commitment to withdrawal is every bit as strong as that of the most ardent “kipper”. Any back-tracking by Mrs May would rip her party apart – and she knows it.

On a more positive note, wrapping up the EU issue once and for all, laying to rest a running sore within her party which has festered for decades. It would be hugely beneficial electorally, rendering the Lib Dems totally irrelevant while causing many former UKIP voters to ask what the party they once supported now stands for.

So what is Mrs May up against in Brussels? The European Council met at the end of last month and its guidelines are published here. Agreement must be completed on three initial areas – the Irish border, the UKs contribution to the EU budget and the rights of EU citizens living in the UK – before discussions on the framework for a future EU-UK relationship.

The divorce talks will take place between the UK and an organisation whose reputation for bureaucracy is rooted in the top-down approach to law and government which characterises many of the member states. Our history is very different. We have been far less likely to legislate to the same degree or in the same sort of detail as our continental neighbours. This dislike of pages of small print has been something of a handicap throughout our sad 44 years as an EU member state. During his time as Prime Minister, John Major was once told by Germany’s former Chancellor Helmut Kohl to “go and read the treaties.” UK politicians, even Prime Ministers, have historically had little idea about what they are signing up to. Unlike their Continental counterparts, they don’t do detail when it comes to the EU.

Mrs May has a reputation for being good at detail, so while Jean-Claude Juncker, the Commission President, may be right in general terms when he said that “I have the impression sometimes that our British friends do underestimate the technical difficulties we have to face,” we can but hope that in the period since becoming Prime Minister, Mrs May has assembled a team around her who, we hope, are preparing to get to grips with the complexities of the negotiations which lie ahead.

On the face of it, the EU is merely requesting the UK to work through a number of technical issues which need to be addressed to ensure a smooth divorce and can therefore claim that it has no wish to punish the UK – just merely to conduct a separation according to a set of rules to which everyone, including the UK, has agreed.

But is this really an accurate picture? Or will the EU set out to make us as miserable as possible while still claiming to be acting according to the rules?

Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek Finance minister who resigned when his party leader caved in to demands for more austerity, says that Mrs May should avoid negotiating with the EU at all cost. “If she doesn’t do that she will fall into the trap of Alexis Tsipras {Greece’s Prime Minister}, and it will end in capitulation,” he told the Daily Telegraph.

“They will give you the EU run-around. You won’t always know exactly who to talk to and that is deliberate. When you make a moderate proposal they will react with blank stares and look at you as if you were reciting the Swedish National Anthem. It is their way of stonewalling.” Professor Varoufakis has suggested that the UK should adopt the EEA/EFTA route, or “Norway Option”, as a transitional arrangement as “they could not refuse this. They wouldn’t have a leg to stand on.”

Mrs May has ruled this out in her utterances so far, although she has not ruled out a transitional arrangement nor given away much detail as to what this might mean.

Varoufakis’ unhappy experience with the EU is not unique. One country has left the European project – Greenland. The EEC (as it then was) was distinctly uncooperative and only when the Greenland government threatened to prevent all EEC boats from fishing in its waters on independence that a deal was finally agreed.

Some economists, notably Professor Patrick Minford of Cardiff University Business School, said that Mrs May and her government need to have a fall-back option if negotiations fail. His proposal is truly radical – unilateral free trade with no tariffs whatsoever. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard called it a “heady Cobdenite manifesto” – and a world apart from Varoufakis’ suggestion.

Mrs May, who was accused by one EU diplomat of living in a “different galaxy”, has indicated that she is not going to be cowed by the EU. On last Sunday’s Andrew Marr show, she said “I am not in a different galaxy. I think what this shows, and what some of the other comments we’ve seen coming from European leaders shows, is that there are going to be times when these negotiations are going to be tough.”  She is unquestionably correct in this assertion.

She has, nonetheless, a strong hand in a few areas, notably fishing, where lack of a deal would hurt the EU more than our fishermen. Security too is not an area the EU would want to leave unresolved, We have the most proficient counter-terrorism operational capability of any state in Europe, according to Veterans for Britain. Indeed, it is the five Anglophone nations or “Five Eyes” – the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, whose intelligence sharing does more than anything else to keep the Western nations safe. The EU would not want to lose out on that link with our security services.

But one other important point is that it is not in the EU’s interests to be seen as punishing us. If it really plays rough, we can let the whole world know. It cannot bully us as it did with Greenland and expect that such behaviour will be ignored by the world’s media. Such behaviour, after all, would lump the EU in the company of the former Soviet Union, the Inquisition and North Korea as being insanely hostile to dissent. At the same time it would send a message to the citizens of the other EU-27 that they are trapped and there is no way out – a recipe for a violent implosion at some point in the future. It would also cause accession states like Serbia and Albania to draw back while snuffing out the residual support for EU membership in countries like Norway and Iceland.  In this country, any heavy-handed tactics by a German-led EU is likely to unite all but the most diehard remainiacs in a determination to  support the Government in toughing it out in order to regain our freedom.

Some prominent withdrawalists have long claimed that Article 50 is a trap, although this has been refuted by other supporters of Brexit.  We are about to find out who is right.

The big EU-UK question

Does the BREXIT negotiating strategy being adopted by our Government stand much chance of success?

The government is exuding a great deal of confidence about the future outcome of its negotiations to leave the European Union (EU). It would be nice to think we can believe its claims, but we need to ask whether they are realistic or whether we should instead be adopting a different, less ambitious, less complex, novel and consequently less risky, approach.

Whilst predicting the future is always guesswork, we should at least attempt to identify the major ‘showstoppers’ and risks to a successful outcome. To put it another way, we must consider some really important underlying assumptions which will need to be right or we could face a potential disaster. We can but hope that this has already been done by the government already as a preliminary to setting negotiating goals and working out our Prime Minister’s winning strategy.

This list is not necessarily exhaustive but includes some significant underlying assumptions upon which is predicated the success or failure of our BREXIT negotiations:-

  1. That pragmatic enlightened flexible mutual self-interest will prevail in the EU hierarchy;
  2. That rational economic considerations override EU political priorities or malice;
  3. That UK’s loss through failure to reach a trading agreement is EU’s loss as well;
  4. That Mrs May can set the EU’s negotiation strategy;
  5. That The World Trade Organisation (WTO) option for trading with the EU is viable;
  6. That negotiating team and administrative arrangements can be adequately resourced.

Let us consider these assumptions in order:-

(1) – The EU hierarchy does not have a great history of actions based on pragmatic enlightened flexible mutual self-interest, but rather the opposite. It has its ideological goals (e.g. increasing Superstate centralisation) which are unremittingly pursued whatever the undesirable consequences. It has inflexible, slow bureaucratic processes and procedures; it is somewhat dominated by the German – French duopoly.  The final deal will be further complicated by the Byzantine high level process involving the vote of the (presently somewhat posturing and hostile) European Parliament and unanimous agreement of all the 27 remaining Member States (presumably pursuing their own self-interests, such as Spain over sovereignty of Gibraltar).

(2) – The EU’s political priorities and ideology have traditionally overridden economic considerations.  Consequently, for example, the relentless economic hardship imposed on the southern European member states, Greece in particular, by the Euro. It is claimed that the austerity imposed on Portugal was a signal to larger economies like Italy that they must tow the German line.  Usually the EU takes years to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) largely because their scope extends far beyond purely trade considerations to include ideological and political features.

(3) – The EU could actually profit at the UK’s expense from a failure to agree a free trade agreement. Over the years, the EU has encouraged the transfer of economic activity from the more advanced Member States to the less developed, often through financial inducements. The EU’s Customs Union is also inherently protectionist, erecting barriers to imports from third countries.  Whilst there are likely to be some business losers, overall EU economic activity could remain the same, and there would be some winners, even in the UK, such as firms able profitably to expand in their protected EU home market.

(4) – There is limited scope to influence the EU’s negotiation strategy or priorities in favour of the UK’s interests. Commonly in contractual arrangements, money and concessions flow from the weakest – or more desperate – party to the strongest or more indifferent. Over the years the UK has not had that much influence in the corridors of EU power to protect its interests.  Leaving must inevitably reduce influence rather than strengthen it especially where any malevolence, greedy envy or dishonesty towards the UK is to be found.

(5) – Trading with the EU under WTO rules is more problematic than closely integrated trading as part of the Single Market – and in some instances, impractical or uncompetitive. The EU’s Customs Union operates tariffs and effectively non-tariff barriers (rules, regulations, inspections, approvals, standards, etc.) to outside imports from third countries, which the UK would become.  WTO rules do not change this situation, and even a free trade agreement may not help much where EU-imposed conditions are impractical to follow.

(6) – The resources needed to negotiate  – and in particular to protect our interests and not be ‘taken for an EU ride’ – have to be built up quickly and without in-fighting. Also, after leaving the EU, its Customs Union and the Single Market, the additional administrative arrangements here and in the EU, such as customs clearance or inspections, have to be in place and running smoothly. Unfortunately, over the years the UK has lost much expertise and knowledge of administrative systems thanks to the transfer of competences to the EU or the operation of the Single Market, whilst the world of intra-EU Member State trade has moved on with increasing volume and complexity.  Additionally, the UK Government has a poor record with large, complex projects – especially relating to information technology.

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In summary, consideration of these assumptions gives some indication of how risky Mrs May’s planned BREXIT strategy is if we are to take it at face value. There exists a significant likelihood of it being ‘derailed’, or at least not turning out as expected.  These six points are obvious areas for concern. Assumptions, if incorrect, cannot be changed, but we can however change our response before and hopefully well before, the worst happens.

There is more than one path for leaving the EU, whilst retaining a satisfactory trading relationship; perhaps our prime minister has something up her sleeve.  It is not impossible that as an interim solution, she may be considering temporary membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which would give us continued access to the European Economic Area (EEA) while still allowing us to leave the political clutches of the EU. This route would allow the UK to control levels of EU migration through unilaterally enacting the Safeguard Provisions in Article 112 of the EEA Agreement.  Remaining within the EEA (UK is currently a member through being in the EU) would retain trading continuity with the EU with the least disruption. Given a choice negotiating with future friendly EFTA partners is more attractive than negotiating with somewhat disgruntled soon to be ex-EU partners.

 

How to negotiate Brexit

Now the UK has triggered Article 50 and is entering negotiations with the rest of the EU, it is worth taking a rough look at what the government should do in the negotiating process.

The Position in 1975

The NO Campaign in 1975 stated “If we withdrew from the Market, we could and should remain members of the wider Free Trade area which now exists between the Common Market and the countries of the European Free Trade Association.”

That position was supported by Enoch Powell and Tony Benn and the NO Campaign in 1975 simply because they recognised that this Free Trade area was a trading association without any political implications.

The EEA [European Economic Area], although considerably modified, is essentially the successor to “the wider Free Trade area”.

Clear Aim and Clear Plan

At present it is unclear whether the government has either a clear aim or a clear plan.

While it is true that the Prime Minister has ruled out the UK remaining in the ‘Single Market’, she has not specifically ruled out retaining EEA membership.

Of course, it would be best to stick with the EEA for at least some years in order to reduce the magnitude of the task of leaving the EU.  More important, any losses in trade from leaving the EEA would be sudden and might affect large amounts of exports, especially goods.  The bright picture of extra trade globally is just that – a bright picture which could take years to bring about.  So there is a major temporal dislocation which must be factored in to future calculations.

If the UK becomes a third country vis-à-vis the EU, there is likely to be a trade in goods exports drop off because of customs and regulatory complexity.

Whether the UK opts for an EEA solution or not, the details of the financial divorce, organising trade relations with other countries on succession to EU trade arrangements, setting up greatly expanded and separate UK customs for the UK, etc., would be necessary.  It is just simpler to do this while UK/EU trade is relatively undisturbed.

How much would the ‘hit’ be?

It is worth looking at the quantities and types of goods exported by the UK to the EU.  Excluding agriculture and fish, whose regulating régimes are specific, goods exports to the EU were about £140 billion per annum in the period 2012-14.

It would seem that about 30% of exports would be relatively unaffected (except possibly by tariffs):

  • Basic materials
  • Coal, gas, etc.
  • Gold and precious stones
  • Motor cars via dedicated export points
  • Ships and aircraft
  • Oil – crude and products

So the ‘at risk’ total is about £95 billion.

The ‘hit’ on this could be estimated quite speculatively at 10-20%, so a loss of trade in goods of £10-20 billion.

This ‘lost trade’ would not necessarily be the same as a financial loss.

Most exported goods contain raw materials and components so there is a ‘netting off’ process.

Trade statistics exaggerate the importance of trade in an economy, and globalised supply chains distort trade statistics even more because of double, triple and more percentage counting.

The actual financial loss to the UK might only be the ‘profit margin’ if the displaced labour and capital could find alternative employment or returned to their country of origin but it would be prudent to assume the net ‘hit’ would be in the £5-10 billion range.

More important would be the disturbance to the structure of the exporting firms and the labour market, with considerable shedding of labour – in manufacturing, a most unfavourable outcome.

Trading under WTO rules

It has been conclusively shown by eureferendum.com that few countries trade purely under WTO rules.  There are numerous trade treaties (not free trade agreements) which govern the trade between the EU and third countries.  These have often taken many years to establish.

The government has said it wishes to establish a Free Trade Agreement with the EU but many hard Brexiteers state that, if a favourable FTA cannot be agreed, the UK would fall back on the WTO rules, but this would be a massive disturbance to existing UK exports to the EU.

There are some quite weak safeguard clauses in the WTO rules.  These were not incorporated in the WTO agreement in anticipation of such a massive and sudden change in trading relationships but, rather, refer to sectoral problems.

However, a scenario where UK goods exports to the EU fall drastically, while EU exports to the UK carry on as normal, is so disturbing and unsustainable that invocation of safeguard clauses might be necessary.

The final fallback position for the UK government in this scenario is trading with the EU under some emergency system such as an Exchange Equalisation Fund.

This, of course, would be a breach of WTO rules but would be the only alternative to financial disaster.  It would, of course, be presented as a temporary measure.

As a matter of political realism, EU Treaty rules and WTO rules are servants to national governments who retain responsibility for the prosperity of their peoples.

Breaching of EU rules have been quite common:

  • Breaches of the budget overspending rules of the EU Stability and Growth Pact by France, Germany and others.
  • Breaches of the Maastricht Treaty on no bail-out clauses for EU member states.
  • Breaches of the Dublin Convention on asylum seekers by Germany and others.

Additionally, many NATO-EU governments have breached NATO agreements on defence spending.

EU rules and treaties have been breached by EU member states and condoned by the EU because they believed, correctly or not, that the prosperity of their peoples required such breaches.

Breaches of the WTO rules fall under the same rubric.  If adherence to WTO rules threatens financial stability and prosperity, they must be considered.

The ‘money’

Whether the UK remains in the EEA or whether it does not, there will be a financial divorce on the UK leaving the EU.

The reason is that the EFTA EEA states have little financial relationship with the EU, making only a small contribution to the workings of the EEA agreement.  Additionally, but outside the EU financial structure, are the Norway and EEA grants.

The EFTA EEA states do not pay anything into the EU budget or have any responsibility for the reste a liquider amounts of EU programmes (except for the EU programmes they have voluntarily joined, such as university research).

More importantly, these states have no liability, contingent liability, guarantees or ‘joint and several’ guarantees to any financial activities of the EU or its institutions, such as the ECB [European Central Bank] or EIB [European Investment Bank], the EFSM [European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism], the EU Balance of Payments programmes etc.  So, moving to EFTA/EEA status would still mean that a financial divorce of the UK from the EU would have to be negotiated.  It should be noted that the potential losses of the ECB and the EIB, which includes an unfunded, irresponsible lending programme begun by Juncker, are absolutely enormous.  One advantage for the UK is that the EU is hardly going to acknowledge these potential losses and include them in its demands.

Another background point before considering the financial divorce is defence costs.

At present the UK is increasing its defence and security presence and spending in Eastern Europe, whereas many NATO countries, as President Trump pointed out to Angela Merkel, do not adhere to NATO spending targets.

It is difficult to see how any financial package on the UK leaving the EU can be discussed when other EU-NATO countries are falling down on their obligations and have serious past shortfalls.

By now, the UK government should have to hand a schedule of what amounts are material to be considered by the UK and the EU on divorce:

  • Defence spending
  • Current budget
  • Reste a liquider amounts

Additionally, the UK should be targeting its extrication from all liabilities, contingent liabilities and guarantees, as well as totalling its contributions to EU assets.

The European Parliament

The divorce terms have to be approved by the European Parliament, which can easily sabotage any agreement in the last few weeks of the two-year negotiating period with or without the encouragement of EU leaders.

It seems obvious, therefore, that at the very beginning the two parties must agree that if the European Parliament rejects an agreement between the EU Council and the UK, the two-year time limit on negotiations must be extended indefinitely.  Otherwise the whole negotiation is at the mercy of an irresponsible actor.

Would Scotland REALLY want to rejoin the EU after Brexit?

Nicola Sturgeon is currently attempting to create the momentum for a second Scottish independence referendum  – alias “Indyref 2”. The 2014 referendum was described at the time as a “once in a generation” but Sturgeon said last Monday that because the UK voted to leave the EU but Scotland did not, there has been a “change in material circumstances” since 2014 that justifies a second vote. She wants to give Scottish voters the option “to follow the U.K. to a hard Brexit — or to become an independent country.”

“Scotland’s future will be decided not just by me, the Scottish government or the (Scottish National Party),” she said. “It will be decided by the people of Scotland. It will be Scotland’s choice. And I trust the people to make that choice.”

Some recent reports claim that the SNP’s plan for an independent Scotland now involve gaining access to the Single Market by rejoining EFTA rather than trying to rejoin the EU. No doubt we will know more after the party’s forthcoming spring conference this weekend, but given the activities of malign individuals like Tony Blair south of the Border,  it is hard to believe that all Scots – and the SNP leadership in particular – have thrown in the towel as far as membership of the EU is concerned.

Perhaps, however, reality is beginning to dawn on at least some pro-remain Scots that rejoining the EU would be on massively disadvantageous terms because the country would not benefit from the opt-outs which successive British Prime Ministers the UK fought for and which the whole UK currently enjoys.

Were Scotland to overcome concerns in Madrid, which is worried about the Catalan separatist movement, as a new state joining the EU, this would be its fate:-

(a) It would have to adopt  the euro currency  – although this can be deferred somewhat.
Furthermore, what currency would a newly independent Scotland use between leaving the UK and joining the EU? Would it use the euro unofficially like ( say) Montenegro?

What is more, to join the Eurozone,  Scotland’s top- heavy public sector would have to be pruned as vigorously as in the “club Med” countries like Greece where many unemployed people no longer have access to the NHS and long-term unemployed households are on income of only 8.40 euros per day

(b) Scotland would not have the derogations which the UK presently enjoys. For instance, VAT would have to be added to food, children’s clothes, books and house sales. The minimum rate would be 5 per cent. But much, much more would be required to make good the deficit left by the withdrawal of subsidies from England

(c) If there were a strong possibility of a yes vote, financial institutions, pension funds, mutual organisations,  charities and other investors with members and clients in England would have a duty of care to protect them from currency risks, possible exchange restrictions and seizure of money from bank accounts (as happened in Cyprus), as an independent government would quickly become financially desperate. This would undermine the position of the considerable Scottish financial,sector.

(d) Scottish energy policy has been based on selling overpriced “renewable” electricity to England and buying cheap, conventionally produced electricity in the other direction when the wind doesn’t blow.
With the discrediting of the global warming myth, Independence would give England an excellent opportunity to discontinue the arrangement.

(e) The unkindest cut of all. There are already excellent English and Welsh whisky brands which could quickly be expanded and much reduce England’s demand for Scotch whisky.

(f) The much smaller area of Scottish territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (Compared with those of the UK as a whole) would be shared among an unchanged number of EU trawlers, barred from English waters by Brexit.

All in all, the prospects for Scotland if it tries to re-join the EU do look bleak.  It is hard to say how widely these negative impacts are known among the Scottish population – or indeed, by Scotland’s politicians. As mentioned above, it is possible that the SNP’s recent talk of looking at EFTA rather than EU membership may be due to their recognition of  harsh reality of these disadvantages.

However, in the event of any attempt to whip up support for re-joining the EU by the SNP or anyone else, we believe the points set out above need to be widely publicised throughout Scotland. For anyone wishing to start the ball rolling, this helpful website gives a list of all Scottish newspapers, great and small.