A request for help from the Australian Monarchist League

Visitors to our 2017 rally may remember the speech by Philip Benwell MBE of the Australian Monarchists League. Mr Benwell has asked for CIB’s support regarding his organisation’s You Tube channel. He writes:-

The Australian Monarchist League has a new YouTube channel which can be accessed here.

You can view some of our new videos by clicking on ‘Playlists’ and then ‘Videos’

However, we need to apply for a shortened URL but need at least 100 subscribers to be able to do this.

We therefore urge those that are able to subscribe to our YouTube channel to do so and thus enable us to make application.

 

Thanking you

Yours sincerely,

 

 

Philip Benwell

National Chair

 

Best be leaving now

The European Commission has launched a public consultation to gather views of the broader public on setting up a European Labour Authority and the introduction of a European Social Security Number.

The European Labour Authority should ensure that EU rules on labour mobility are enforced in a fair, simple and effective way. Concretely, building on existing structures, the Authority would support national administrations, businesses, and mobile workers by strengthening cooperation at EU level on matters such as cross-border mobility and social security coordination. It would also improve access to information for public authorities and mobile workers and enhance transparency regarding their rights and obligations.

The European Social Security Number (ESSN) aims at simplifying and modernising citizens’ interaction with administrations in a range of policy areas. An EU Social Security Number would facilitate the identification of persons across borders for the purposes of social security coordination and allow the quick and accurate verification of their social security insurance status. It would facilitate administrative procedures for citizens by optimising the use of digital tools”.

Both initiatives were announced by President Juncker in his 2017 State of the Union address. Legislative proposals for both initiatives are announced in the European Commission’s Work Programme for 2018 and planned to be tabled by spring 2018.

There are two ways to look at this. This could be viewed as the EU steaming ahead to do all that which it could not do with the UK as a member, much like PESCO. The other way to look at it is that this was always the direction of travel. UK membership only really governs the pace of integration and a “public consultation” means they are going to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.

Either way, this is not the domain of a mere trade bloc. This is an instrument of an emerging supreme government, to which the UK would otherwise be subordinate. It is the foundation of Juncker’s “Social Europe” meaning that social and welfare policy will gradually drift toward Brussels and far out of the reach of democracy. Of course, this would follow that much vaunted Brussels subsidiarity principle. You are free to have any have any policy you like, just so long as it stays within the parameters defined by the Commission and the ECJ.

And this is the thing with the EU. Once consent is established for the basic foundation, the ossification process begins to the point where you no longer have the power, reform is impossible and like trade and agriculture, it simply drops out of public discourse. Why debate that which cannot be influenced? This is how we drift from democracy to technocracy – and subsequently stagnation and disaffection. That is why I would vote to leave every single time.

EU finally comes clean on future UK-EU military objectives, but risks remain

By David Banks. This piece first appeared on the Veterans for Britain website and is reproduced with permission.

In a speech in Berlin today, Michel Barnier (the EU’s Brexit negotiator) for the first time explicitly spells out some interpretations over future UK-EU military relations under Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the new EU policy ambition in this field.  The text can be found here.

Some of these comments are welcome. In particular, in saying “Any voluntary participation of the United Kingdom in European defence will confer rights and obligations in proportion to the level of this participation,” Mr Barnier is indicating that UK participation on an ad hoc basis in missions can generate corresponding engagement at the political level. Clarity is needed on this point, but it does seem that the approach is heading towards a flexible structure rather than seeking to tie the UK down in fixed EU treaty obligations.

Again, Mr Barnier acknowledges that there are several existing models of cooperation and not just the Norway one, a model which is tied into membership of the Single Market. That requirement appears to have been dropped by the Commission. More widely, this may even be the first admission that a special FTA deal is achievable, since several such models do already exist lying between WTO Status and EEA membership.

However, there are also clear remaining issues. While UK membership of the European Defence Agency is ruled out, some sort of structured affiliation is not. Yet the EDA is core to future EU defence integration and formal UK adhesion beyond observer status carries budgetary obligations and political risks.

Also, the EU recognises the UK will continue to play a bilateral and multilateral role, especially through NATO. But PESCO has identified non-NATO multilaterals as targets to come increasingly under the PESCO banner. We also note the cheeky attempt to appropriate the St Mâlo agreement at the very end. The EU has wide eyes and a big appetite in agreements that are not part of the menu.

Tellingly, Barnier is tacitly admitting, in saying that “The British have never wanted to turn the Union into a military power”, that the EU now seeks to do just that.

Major-General Julian Thompson, chairman of Veterans for Britain, said:

“M. Barnier offers a backhanded compliment to the importance of the UK to European Defence – a term which of course is not the same thing as the EU’s precocious military appetite.

“It is not in the UK’s interest to institutionally weld itself to this ‘Security ERM’. Post Brexit, the UK should cooperate in missions and projects of clear joint interest. It is a positive sign that the Commission’s chief Brexit negotiator recognises this prospect.”

Colonel Richard Kemp also of Veterans for Britain said:

“EU defence integration clearly remains a threat to NATO, and to UK multilateralism inside Europe but outside the EU. EU ambitions are extensive and dangerous.”

Referring to the outrageous opening inference of the Brexit vote as a betrayal of the fight against terror, Col Kemp added:

“This is an insult to the electorate of the first order. But then, the European Commission has never understood either democracy or adverse votes.

“The EU has brought a lot of its terror-related problems on itself. In contrast, the UK has been the most capable in defence and security and has been the bulwark of anti-terrorism in Europe.”

Photo by DVIDSHUB

Deal or no deal? Some thoughts on last week’s meeting

Last week I, along with about 90 other people, attended a conference entitled Deal or no deal – what are the options? hosted by David Campbell Bannerman MEP.  I was very much hoping to hear something of the government’s current thinking about the progress of the Brexit negotiations with the EU.

The opening speaker, Rt Hon Greg Hands MP, gave a very upbeat assessment of our trading opportunities post-Brexit. His department, he assured us, is ready, come what may. Nine new trade commissioners are to be appointed and our new tariff schedules are being prepared for the World Trade Organisation. At a time when protectionism is on the increase, there is considerable enthusiasm in some quarters (which he did not name) for a new independent UK to re-emerge as a champion of global free trade. He was adamant that all the major countries with whom the EU had signed trade deals were keen to continue a similar arrangement with us on Brexit.

One member of the audience expressed concern about how high standards in agriculture could be maintained if trade was to become freer. Mr Hands insisted that there would be no lowering of standards on food quality and we would not be flooded with poor-quality imports (Presumably a reference to chlorine-washed chickens about which there are currently many worries)

David Campbell Bannerman then introduced what he called the “Super Canada” option which, he claimed, was the Government’s  preferred option. This was no surprise, given that a few days beforehand, the EU was widely reported as considering a deal along the lines of CETA, the EU/Canada deal, with the UK. This has been strongly criticised both by the left and by other informed commentators for its inadequacy. Mr Bannerman said that the EU likes the CETA deal and intends to use it as a template for future trade deals with Australia and New Zealand too, Twelve of the 30 chapters in this deal would need no change, he informed us. The others would not be suitable without re-writing, as we would (presumably) wish to protect the NHS  The EU is worried about the future UK attitude towards regulation, as it doesn’t want to see us becoming the Singapore of the North Atlantic, an option enthusiastically supported by, among others, Owen Paterson, whose piece appeared, perhaps coincidentally, on the same day as this conference.

David Davis gave the keynote speech. He stated that he does not want to end up with no deal and is confident that we will get a deal. He pointed out the areas where progress had been made and insisted that our exit will be conducted in a smooth, orderly way.

There was, nonetheless, a possibility that we may not get a deal, but Whitehall was preparing for every eventuality.

Mrs May has consistently rejected using Norway as a model and Helle Hagenau, a familiar face to our more long-standing members, explained some of the pitfalls. Although advising against our staying in the EEA, however, she felt it was worth our re-joining EFTA as we needed some trading arrangement with the four EFTA countries once we leave. Switzerland is our sixth most important trading partner while bilateral trade with Norway  was worth £18.57 billion in 2015. She did, however, mention that although EFTA courts are not bound to implement the ECJ rulings, , they were in fact doing so, even though the ECJ has no direct power to intervene in EEA matters and the actions of the EFTA court was an encroachment on the original basis of the EEA agreement.  With the alleged indivisibility of the “Four freedoms” of the Single Market mentioned on a couple of occasions during the morning, I was surprised that no one mentioned Liechtenstein’s unilateral restriction on free movement of people at this point.

The final speaker was Rt Hon David Jones, who had formerly worked as a minister in DExEU (the Department for Exiting the European Union)  who informed the meeting that any role for the ECJ in our affairs post-Brexit would be totally unacceptable to him and a number of his colleagues. If this meant we would leave with no deal, then as far as he was concerned, so be it.

Interestingly, little was said about the details of any transitional arrangement, which as we have pointed out, the EU is only prepared to offer us under terms which would see us still under the thumb of the ECJ. We can therefore presume that Mr Jones and a number of his colleagues will be  equally opposed to any such arrangement.

Although only billed as a “comment” rather than a speech, the few words shared by Hans-Olaf Henkel of the BDI, the German equivalent of our CBI, were well received. Although he regretted our vote to leave the EU and still hoped Brexit wouldn’t happen,  he was most unimpressed with the way the EU was handling the negotiations. He referred in particular to the “divorce bill” which  he regarded as unacceptable. He also said that Brexit was the fault of Brussels, although his statement that “you joined an EU of sovereign nations and suddenly someone decided to make a United States of Europe out of it” was a rather naive comment given the United States of Europe was always the destination of the European project, right from the days of Jean Monnet.

It was good to meet up with a number of colleagues from other campaign organisations, quite a few of whom I had not seen since the referendum.  It was worth attending this meeting, although I came away with a clear sense that not everyone in the government is singing from the same songsheet, so perhaps the lack of a clear Brexit strategy is understandable given the balancing act required to avoid a massive rebellion on the back benches.

Among the other attendees was Viscount Matt Ridley, whose rather witty comments on the conference may be of interest. They can be found here.

Risk management of Brexit to date

Politicians generally don’t give much thought to risks and risk management. After all, risks are part of the downside of their policies (or ‘bright ideas’) and they try to airbrush or spin them out of the narrative.  Whilst risks and their effective management are serious concerns across all areas of government from agriculture, through defensive and security, education, international relations, justice, law and order, to the economy, the National Health Service etc., a successful Brexit presents unique challenges. Furthermore, it does not help that the government has had to start from a state of total unpreparedness; Messrs Cameron and Osborne prevented the Civil Service from preparing any viable Brexit plan.  So how well are Mrs May and Mr Davis doing – both in understanding the risks involved and effectively managing them?

‘In-depth’ subject knowledge is obviously essential to being able to ‘tease out’, understand and manage risks. An aircraft pilot who knows nothing (if allowed to fly at all) is potentially dangerous, and so is a clueless politician. Sadly, this government has not given any serious indication that it knows much about how trade deals are negotiated or even how the EU works. There is very little, if any, detail in Mrs May’s and Mr Davis’s pronouncements. We hear predominantly robotic mantras, aspirations and wishful thinking. There also seems to be an unwillingness to acquire that necessary in-depth knowledge.

Subject knowledge is not enough to manage risks. Our Brexit team needs to understand the subtleties of the EU’s approach to risk and its effective control, and hence how these impact on the Article 50 negotiations.  The EU in general – in theory if not in practice – follows something like the Prussian edict ‘everything is forbidden except that which is allowed’. Pre-emptive mandatory standardised (inflexible) regulation controls risks at each stage of activity, with the result that an acceptable outcome is achieved.  Regulation gives rise to surveillance, monitoring, oversight and ultimately centralised control by the EU’s bureaucracy. Anyone with some exposure to this environment in one field should be able to recognise the same general approach, some of the terminology and regulatory or monitoring agencies, and role of the centralised EU bureaucracy, when they encounter it elsewhere.  The EU’s approach also fits in well with extending control into an ever-increasing number of areas, thus fulfilling its mission of creating a superstate.

The traditional alternative to the EU’s approach to risk management is to emphasise accountability. When things go wrong there are the options of civil courts, damages, or even criminal prosecution. In the case of politicians, they will be ejected from office. In English law, everything – in theory – is allowed except that which is expressly forbidden.  In practice, this purity is often replaced by some form of hybrid of ever-expanding regulation and increasingly punitive accountability.  Mrs May and Mr Davis, perhaps because they were schooled outside the EU loop, seem unable to understand or accept the EU’s rigidity, its risk control rationale or the implications for the Brexit negotiations and the resulting risks posed.

Mrs May’s commitment to leave the Single Market and instead negotiate a bespoke free trade agreement supposedly providing equivalent utility appears indicative of poor risk management.  This decision was reportedly made by her alone after consulting her closest advisor and without involving the cabinet or even discussing it with them.  It was a similar story regarding her decision to call a general election in last June, with disastrous results for her party and her reputation.  Mrs May does appear to make decisions based on flimsy advice, ignoring sensible safeguards and risk management tools.

Mrs May has ended up choosing the most difficult and complex Brexit option, requiring the greatest flexibility and cooperation from the EU and the most (competent) resources. We are not told what other options for leaving were considered, what risks were posed and why they were dismissed.  There also appears to be nothing actually in place (or comprehensively planned) to absorb any potential problems or risks.  To date, little or no progress appears to have been made in successfully delivering her ambitions or mitigating the risks. Meanwhile, time is marching on.

The approach to negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU has once again demonstrated a cavalier approach to the management of risk. We are told it will be all right in the end, because at the eleventh hour the EU will cave in and give everything wanted.  It is highly unlikely that it will do so, but even if it does, leaving a significant part of the future economic wellbeing of the country in a state of uncertainty until the last minute is a huge risk. It is a wild gamble based on successfully negotiating a myriad of potentially show-stopping trade (and other) conditions and one which totally ignores the EU’s general approach to risk management, which I have outlined above.

Just suppose that the EU caved in to Mrs May’s demands for an ambitious, innovative, deep and special relationship. It would create a precedent which would cause much concern in Brussels. Granting any exceptions to one country (even if possible) would open up disorderly and uncontrolled challenges elsewhere and could violate the EU’s general risk control philosophy.

Then the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, spun as providing certainty in the fundamentally changed situation of ‘third country’ status outside the EU and the Single Market contains many undisclosed potential problems and risks. Some pieces of transposed EU legislation may not actually function as intended, because they were designed to operate in an environment of close integration with the EU and its administrative apparatus. The Fisheries regulation 1380/2013 is a good example.

It would be a tragedy if we ended up with a poor Brexit because of poor risk management. Brexit provides us with a tremendous opportunity to escape the clutches of the EU’s political folly with its unaccountable, extravagant agenda to create a superstate regardless of the costs to its subsumed peoples. Effective risk management historically does not form part of the EU’s political agenda or mitigate its actions. By contrast, the return of full responsible government to these shores should mean our elected representatives will once again respond positively to the wishes of the people, accepting responsibility for their actions and – most importantly of all – behaving responsibly.

Being European – is it geographical, cultural or political?

During last year’s referendum campaign, one helpful piece of advice we were given was to make sure we made a differentiation between “Europe” and “the European Union”. My experience was typical inasmuch as our opponents – deliberately, so it seemed – tried to confuse the two, as if leaving the EU meant somehow leaving “Europe”.

In fairness, however, no one against whom I debated went as far as Nick Clegg, who seemed to believe that leaving the EU would somehow change our physical location. “There’s nothing bulldog about Britain hovering somewhere in the mid-Atlantic” he once said on the Andrew Marr. Well, Nick, old chap, to my knowledge Dover is still only 21 miles for Calais after the Brexit vote and even the most astute observers of the Brexit process have not heard a whisper of any plans to move our island further away from the European mainland in March 2019.

Seriously, though,  what does it mean to be European? I had always believed it was a matter of geography.  The UK is not an Asian or African country; we may feel a closer cultural affinity with North America or the Commonwealth realms than, say, with Estonia or Portugal, but these places are thousands of miles away. We may also place immense symbolic and historical value on those 21 miles of water separating us from France, but we are Europeans, like it or not.

The EU, however, seems to think otherwise. In 2023, there will be a number of new European Capitals of Culture and Brussels has told Leeds and Dundee, among others, that they are not eligible to bid because by then we will be neither in the EU, the EEA nor an EU accession state. It seems quite bizarre when you look at the list of countries which have already gained this designation and consider that there in the heart of our continent is Switzerland which is excluded. Yes, even a great city like Geneva which has exercised a huge influence in the development of Europe cannot be regarded as “European” by the EU! Russia likewise, which includes Peter the Great’s European-style capital city and which has given us composers in the European tradition like Glinka, Borodin and Tchaikovsky is also excluded.

And now we will find ourselves made shut out as well.  The EU has decided that being European is a matter of politics. We can only regret that the EU will not swap competences for the Capitals of Culture with the European Broadcasting Union, which currently determines eligibility for the Eurovision Song Contest. Being excluded from this display of banality and mediocrity, in which our artists fail year after year, would not perhaps be the biggest benefit of leaving the EU but one which, if on offer last year, might nevertheless have helped secure us a larger majority!